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PERFORMING DISCRETION OR PERFORMING
DISCRIMINATION: RACE, RITUAL, AND PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES IN CAPITAL JURY SELECTION
Melyndaj. Price*
Research shows the mere presence of Blacks on capital juries-on the rare occasions
they are seated--can mean the difference between life and death. Peremptory
challenges are the primary method to remove these pivotal participants. Batson v.
Kentucky developed hearings as an immediate remedy for the unconstitutional
removal of jurors through racially motivated peremptory challenges. These
proceedings have become rituals that sanction continued bias in the jury selection
process and ultimately affect the outcome of capital trials. This Article deconstructs
the role of the Batson ritual in legitimating the removal of African American jurors.
These perfunctory hearings fail to meaningfully interrogate the reasons prosecutors
offer as race neutral motivations for peremptorily striking Black jurors.
In my examination of "race neutral" removals in Texas courts, I demonstrate how
the focus on form has failed to solve the substantive problem of racially
discriminatory uses of peremptory challenges. Cases from these courts have been
critical in the Supreme Court jurisprudence that developed the process for deciphering
racially motivated uses of this legal tool. Although Batson hearings have proven to
be a weak legal instrument, they nevertheless repeatedly remind us of the persistence
of racially discriminatory uses of peremptory challenges and the failure of current
measures to prevent such discrimination. Building on the suggestion by Akhil Amar
to 'preempt peremptories," this Article calls for the reexamination of the use of this
practice, particularly in capital trials, in a justice system that purports interest in
protecting that system from racial discrimination.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article originates in my long fascination with the jury in the
American criminal justice system. The popular mystique of the jury could
be attributed to classic cinematic portrayals of jury deliberations in films
like 12 ANGRY MEN where the jurors painstakingly excavate their individ-
ual biases and human weaknesses while deliberating in a criminal trial.' In
early viewings, the complexity of the interactions during the deliberations
dominated my understanding of the film. As a scholar whose interests
now are in the fairness of criminal proceedings and outcomes, I find my-
self wanting the magic of motion pictures to return us to the part of the
story where this jury was selected. What were the responses of these jurors
during voir dire? Or the responses of those members of the panel re-
moved for cause? What instincts or lessons learned in the lawyers' practical
experience led to the removal of those excused using peremptory chal-
lenges?
2
1. 12 ANGRY MEN (United Artists 1957).
2. Peremptory challenges are a tool that allows litigants to remove jurors for moti-
vations for "which no reason need be given or cause assigned." 47 AM. JUR. 2DJury § 206
(2009)("While challenges for cause permit rejection of jurors on a narrowly specified,
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Although 12 ANGRY MEN intentionally refuses to locate the film in
any particular urban landscape or identify the nationality or ethnicity of
the defendant, the characters' accents and demeanor suggest a provenance
quite different from other films of this period that also portray all-White,
all-male juries situated in the South.3 This second image of the jury also
symbolizes the American criminal justice system and, it should be noted,
is one where there is rarely, if ever, a depiction of deliberation. But the
appearance of this Southern jury-frequently with at least one member
in bib overalls-has come to represent clear and unfettered bias in legal
decision making. This stands in contrast to the 12 ANGRY MEN jury, which
portrays individuals struggling to overcome bias and limited vision to get
to the Truth.
Fiction filmmakers, however, possess a power rarely available to prac-
titioners and scholars. They have the ability to peer into the deliberative
process-a process whose legal impenetrability has been reinforced by the
Supreme Court.' Though insight into the deliberative process would be
incredibly helpful in understanding how juries decide cases, the rest of the
record has yet to be exhausted of its analytical contribution to our under-
standing of the articulation and practice of racial discrimination in
choosing this key component of criminal trials-the jury. In capital cases,
the jury is an even more important and litigated issue than other areas of
criminal law. Furthermore, the racial composition of capital juries can
mean the difference between life and death for certain defendants. Re-
search conducted by the Capital Jury Project ("CJP") demonstrates that
provable, and legally cognizable basis of partiality, the peremptory permits rejection for a
real or imagined partiality that is less easily designated or demonstrable.").
3. I use nationality and ethnicity because although the early minutes of the film
offer a shadowy glimpse of a seemingly White defendant, clear attempts by a number of
the jurors to "other" the defendant parallel portrayals of race and racial minorities in
criminal cases. The image of the Southern jury tends to be more racialized-for both the
jurors and the defendants-than the image in 12 ANGRY MEN, despite the fact that both
are depictions ofjuries that are all White and all male. Similar questions can be deployed
in both instances about inclusivity and discrimination in the selection process. The South-
em jury, however, is a relevant counterpoint in this analysis because of the racial and
regional history of capital punishment. The arguments herein demonstrate that it is diffi-
cult to sever this connection, even in contemporary analysis.
4. The United States Supreme Court has reinforced the barriers that prevent at-
torneys and others to interrogate jurors post-verdict. In Tanner v. United States, evidence
of drug abuse and drug dealing among jurors during deliberations surfaced after the ver-
dict. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 122 (1987). Justice O'Connor argued despite
the presence of illegal drugs "and their improper use, drugs or alcohol voluntarily ingested
by a juror seems no more an 'outside influence' than a virus, poorly prepared food, or a
lack of sleep." Id. at 124-25. For the Tanner majority, the restriction ofall deliberations to
the jury, without any third party post-trial intrusion, is part of the strength of the Ameri-
can jury system. Id. Post-trial investigations into how jury decisions are made undermine
this system. Id. at 127. The commitment to secrecy, the inability to interrogate jurors
concerning jury decisions, and popular imagery together make jury deliberations the least
understood aspect of the trial process.
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the mere presence of one Black male on capital juries with a Black de-
fendant and a White victim makes a jury nearly twice as likely to give life
sentences.5 The profound nature of the punishment meted out by juries in
capital cases has made understanding the factors that influence outcomes a
large area of theoretical and empirical research on the death penalty.'
These studies provide significant insight into how capital juries make de-
cisions and the role of race in these decisions, but they are necessarily off
the record and are frequently post hoc.
This Article focuses on Batson hearings, which are explicit attempts
to ensure that parties do not discriminate on the basis of race when se-
lecting juries and to prevent or correct any race-based discrimination at
the point it occurs . Batson hearings take place within the jury selection
process, which is by its very nature discriminating.8 Of interest here is the
method by which courts police the limits imposed on the selection proc-
ess by Batson v. Kentucky. By bringing together research from scholarship
in legal, social science and cultural studies, this Article explores the multi-
ple meanings of interactions between state and citizen in this legal
moment, and seeks to demonstrate the continuation of racial discrimina-
tion and the impact of that discrimination on the outcome of capital
trials.
This Article argues that it is time to re-think Batson hearings and ul-
timately, the utility of peremptory challenges. Batson hearings are unique,
not only in law, but also in the state's administration of its duties. They
represent one of the few places where a representative of the state is re-
quired to stop in the act of doing his or her job and explain how he or
she has done that job in a race neutral manner. This Article maintains that
this repetitive event in criminal trials, particularly capital trials, with their
consistent structure and transmission of the state's views of who should
participate in the finding of guilt or innocence and the determination of
5. Capital juries with one or more Black males on the jury gave life sentences in
71.9% of cases with a Black defendant and a White victim as opposed to juries with no
Black males, which gave life sentences in 37.5% of cases. William J. Bowers et al., Death
Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical Analysis of the Role ofJury Racial Composition and
the Juror's Race, 3 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 171, 193 (2001).
6. The best example of this line of research comes from the CJP, which has ana-
lyzed decision making among capital jurors since 1991. Capital Jury Project,
http://www.albany.edu/scj/CJPwhat.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2008). The CJP has con-
ducted over 1,200 interviews with jurors in capital cases in over 350 cases across 14 states
including Texas. The data from this project has spawned more than 30 articles. Addition-
ally, the CJP's work on death qualification is a good example that is quite relevant to this
analysis. See, e.g., Hovey v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 616 P.2d 1301, 1314-41
(1980) (discussing various studies on death qualification).
7. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93-95 (1986).
8. By discriminating, I am referring to the need to whittle large numbers of citi-
zens into a twelve person deliberative body, which requires some value judgments about
eligibility and desirability for service.
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life or death, should be understood in terms of ritual more than legal
meaning. The legal meaning of these hearings is debatable because of the
extremely low evidentiary standard the state must meet to show a lack of
bias. These hearings are more a ritual than an effective legal instrument to
combat improper selection of juries because the state's performance of the
process is more important than the actual selection of a jury without dis-
crimination.The ritual of the Batson hearing perpetuates a veneer of racial
inclusion that is substantively false.
In actuality, Batson objections and hearings do not remedy racially
discriminatory jury practices. They instead erect a process that masks the
state's continuing discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges. Ini-
tially, this unique performance by the state, meant to ensure that litigants
do not use peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner,
appeared to be a progressive and immediate remedy for constitutional
violations. However, courts' lack of meaningful investigation into prosecu-
torial motives during Batson hearings means that everything short of an
explicitly racial statement-e.g., "I do not want this juror because they are
black"-is upheld as race neutral reasoning for exclusion. 9 This leads to
the question,"If Batson challenges are not doing what they have been cre-
ated to do--that is, prevent the removal of potential jurors because of
their race-what work may they actually be doing?" The answer this Arti-
cle offers is that Batson hearings allow for the appearance of fairness while
requiring little work on the part of courts and prosecutors to alter biased
practices.
The state points to these hearings as visible examples of efforts to
combat discrimination in jury selection. This Article questions the under-
lying validity of these proceedings, given that they do not change the fact
that peremptory challenges lead to fewer Blacks on capital juries.10 This
9. The lack of meaningful investigation is evinced by the fact that in the first dec-
ade after Batson, the Court of Criminal Appeals only overturned one case involving the
racially motivated use of peremptory challenges. See Chambers v. Texas, 742 S.W.2d 695
(Tex. Crim. App. 1988). It is not clear that the Court always intended such a low thresh-
old to exist in evaluating race neutral reasons offered by prosecutors. However, with the
decision in Hernandez v. New York, the Court established two points that are important to
later evaluations of Batson claims. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 372 (1991).
First, the standard for a prosecutor to make a showing of race neutrality, as required to
overcome claims of bias, is low. Id. at 360. Second, demonstrating that peremptory chal-
lenges disproportionately impact a single group is not necessarily enough to give rise to an
inference of discrimination. Id. at 362.
10. One review of capital cases from the mid to late 1970s in Florida showed pat-
terns of racial discrimination in peremptory challenges. Bruce J. Winick, Prosecutorial
Peremptory Challenge Practices in Capital Cases: An Empirical Study and a Constitutional Analy-
sis, 81 MicH. L. REv. 1, 43-44 (1982). Studies in other states showed similar results. See
generally David Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials, 3 U.
PA. J. CoNST. L. 3, 10 (2001); Mary R. Rose, The Peremptory Challenge Accused of Race or
Gender Discrimination? Some Data fom One County, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 695, 697
(1999); Billy M. Turner et al., Race and Peremptory Challenges During Voir Dire: Do Prosecution
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Article first offers a close reading of Batson decisions in the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals ("CCA"). " By examining African Americans' voir dire
responses and prosecutors' interpretations of those responses, this Article
demonstrates that racial discrimination and race neutrality have become
indistinguishable in Batson cases. Going through the motions of Batson
hearings alone allows the state to give criminal proceedings the imprima-
tur of fairness while legitimating the removal of African American jurors.
The Article then argues against the continued use of peremptory chal-
lenges as a true step toward ending the discrimination that Batson hearings
claim to address.
The Article begins in Part I with a discussion of how the seating of
African Americans on capital juries significantly affects the outcome of
capital cases. Part II outlines the Supreme Court's adjudication of the use
of race in the jury selection process and discusses other structural issues
that impede African American representation in jury pools and participa-
tion in trial juries. This section also explores the decisions that led to the
development of the Batson hearing and the current constitutional under-
standing of how to review claims of racial discrimination in the use of
peremptory challenges. Part III maps the legal landscape on which the
ritual of the Batson hearing is created using theories from cultural studies
and speculates on the messages and values communicated by the perform-
ances of prosecutors and African American members of the venire in
Batson hearings. Part IV discusses the methodological approach to case
selection and describes the data, which are drawn primarily from the
Texas CCA.1 2 Part V then deconstructs the practical implications of the
Batson ritual. Next, Part VI directly addresses the way discriminatory uses
of peremptory challenges act as a co-conspirator, together with the re-
and Defense Agree?, 14 J. CRIM. JUST. 61, 63 (1986); Holly Becka, Steve McGonigle, Tim
Wyatt & Jennifer La Fleur, Disputed Practice Still a Courtroom Fixture; Peremptory Challenges
Survive Calls for Reform, Decades of Controversy, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 24, 2006,
http://wvw.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/longterm/stories/082305dnprojur
ystrikes.d5c6e76.html.
11. In Texas, there is a singular intermediate appeals court-the Texas Court of Ap-
peals-but the highest courts are bifurcated. The Texas Supreme Court hears civil cases
and criminal cases are heard in the Court of Criminal Appeals ("CCA"). In Texas, all
criminal cases are appealed to the CCA. More information on the Texas court structure
can be found at Texas Courts Online (TCO), http://www.courts.state.tx.us/ (last visited
Nov. 29, 2009).
12. 1 chose this particular state and court because of their importance in understand-
ing both the death penalty and racial discrimination in jury selection. Between 1880 and
1980, the U.S. Supreme Court heard forty-one cases involving the under-representation of
Blacks on juries and two on the under-representation of Hispanics. HutosHi FUKURAI ET
AL., RACE AND THE JURY: RACIAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 83
(1993). Texas was the jurisdiction of origin for more Black juror participation cases than
any state except for Georgia during this time period. Id. (noting that both Texas and
Georgia both had eight cases of this type). Additionally, both of the cases involving His-
panics during this time period originated in Texas. Id.
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quirement of death qualification, to make Black jurors in capital cases ex-
tremely rare. Part VII of the Article argues against the continued
performance of these rituals and calls for an end to the use of peremptory
challenges. The Article concludes by suggesting that the failure to success-
fully end discrimination through Batson hearings may be due to the
substantial focus on the fairness of the process for defendants, rather than
the role these failures play in constraining the rights of African American
citizens to participate in the deliberative process of criminal adjudication.
I.THE LIFE AND DEATH CONSEQUENCES OF
RACE AND CAPITAL JURIES
The jury has long been a critical space for citizens to communicate
their opinions of the propriety of the behavior of their fellow citizens.
However, a number of groups, including African Americans, have not al-
ways enjoyed the right to jury participation. 13 Through litigation,
safeguards have evolved to protect the rights of defendants to have juries
that reflect the community at large and the rights of all citizens to partici-
pate in juries. 4 It is the rights of both these constituencies-the
defendant and the citizen in the jury pool-that courts attempt to recon-
cile when analyzing the jury selection process in Batson hearings.
However, these machinations have not reduced continuing disparities be-
tween Whites and African Americans, as well as other racial minorities,
who participate in trials as jurors, or even make it to the panel of potential
jurors."
Popular notions of the jury as a site where citizens decide whether
behavior is fair or correct overlook the way jury decisions also implicitly
and explicitly incorporate the prejudices of the citizenry into understand-
ings of fairness 6 The ethical and legal commitments at work in
community evaluations of guilt, as well the limitations of human processes,
make the jury an important site for litigation and study. The cases in this
section can be read as an attempt to balance those ethical commitments
13. Id.
14. See id. at 13-17.
15. See, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L.
REV. 1611 (1985) (discussing race and the evaluation of innocence in criminal trials);
Nancy J. King, Racial Gerrymandering: Cancer or Cure? A Contemporary Review of Affirmative
Action injury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 707 (1993) (discussing the persistence of a lack
of diversity in the racial composition ofjuries).
16. A study by Hale and McCormick shows that "seventy to seventy-five percent
ofjurors have a 'definite' opinion about who is right in the case by the end ofvoir dire."
V. HALE STARR & MARK McCORMICK, JuRY SELECTION § 8.01 (3d ed. 2001). They also
found that eighty percent ofjurors make up their minds about a case by the end of open-
ing statements. Id. This finding illustrates the significance of the jury selection process, as
well as the early interactions between litigants and jury, on the outcome of a trial.
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with the reality of racial discrimination in the selection process. After fac-
toring in the additional need to protect the interests of criminal
defendants, this balancing act at times is unable to satisfy all the conditions
necessary for a fair jury system.
Many of the early cases dealing with the prohibition of racial mi-
norities from jury participation were decided on the grounds that the
right to serve on juries is a fundamental attribute of citizenship."7 How-
ever, the importance of African American participation in capital juries
goes beyond basic questions of citizenship. Research from the CJP shows
that "black jurors [are] far more likely than their white counterparts to
have lingering doubts about the defendant's guilt" and are "less willing to
believe that the capital sentencing process is error free."'8 Black jurors are
also more likely to view defendants as "remorseful."'' 9 Professor Bowers
and his coauthors suggest this finding can be attributed to Black jurors
being more acutely attuned to the way Black defendants signal remorse,
20
which then leads to feelings that a defendant warrants mercy.
The polarization of the views of Black and White jurors is even
more pronounced when gender is included in the analysis. As in other
areas of the law where remorse is a factor, studies show that views on the
death penalty also vary with gender.21 Jurors with five or more White
males are more than twice as likely to impose death as juries with four or
less. 2 With Black men, however, there is no threshold effect, which means
that there is no number that must be attained before the impact of a
Black male juror on sentencing manifests. 2 One is enough. According to
the research of the CJP, the mere presence of a Black man on a capital
17. See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 207-
245 (2005) (providing background information on the relationship between the United
States Constitution and jury trials).
18. William J. Bowers et. al, Crossing Racial Boundaries: A Closer Look at the Roots of
Racial Bias in Capital Sentencing Mhen the Defendant is Black and the Victim is White, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 1497, 1502 (2003). The CJP also found that in cases with a Black defen-
dant and a White victim, Black jurors and White jurors become polarized more than in
cases of intra-racial murder with Blacks in favor of life and Whites in favor of death. Id. at
1501. This issue of the potentially polarizing effects of juries with multi-racial members
should be noted in light of the issues and suggestions raised in this analysis. Id.
19. Id. at 1502.
20. Id. at 1502-1503. Mercy, in this instance, would be life in prison rather than a
death sentence.
21. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Golding et al., The Effect of Gender in the Perception of Elder
Physical Abuse in Court, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 605, 605-14 (2005) (finding gender
differences in views on remorse and abuse in psychological studies of other criminal
cases).
22. Bowers et al., supra note 5, at 193.
23. Bowers et al., supra note 18, at 1513.
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jury-even if he supports the death penalty--substantially increases the
likelihood of a life sentence in cases with Black defendants.24
The impact of Blacks on capital juries also points to the importance
of the notion of linked fate, the predominant theory of African American
attitude formation on public policy issues.2' It is not simply, as Bowers and
his various coauthors suggest, that Blacks may be more cued into demon-
strations of remorse by other Blacks. Linked fate theory argues that Blacks
are also cued into a common experience with the state and particularly
'6
with discrimination. This theory has been persistent and strong in its
demonstration of the way in which African Americans overwhelmingly
believe their individual fate is tied to the collective destiny of other Afri-S 27
can Americans. When Black jurors read the remorsefulness of Black
defendants, they, according to the theory of linked fate, also read a collec-
tive experience with the criminal justice system and the common values
that determine one's views on the death penalty. In a particular case, the
fate of the defendant is the primary issue, but, if we take seriously the ar-
gument that criminal punishment is a signifier of social status, racial
discrimination in other aspects of the process also works to communicate
the location of African Americans in the larger society.
Consider empirical evidence of the racially divergent views on the
issue of future dangerousness, an issue that juries address in the sentencing
phase of capital trials. According to the Texas procedural rules, the jury
must state that it believes "there is a probability that the defendant would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing
24. Id. at 1501. Bowers refers to the particular effects of these gender and racial
groups on capital juries as "white male dominance" and "black male presence." Bowers et
al., supra note 5, at 192.
25. Linked fate is also the predominant theory of African American political behav-
ior. It is a well-tested measure of both of these aspects of Black politics. For a discussion
of the impact of linked fate on African American political participation and attitudes, see,
for example, MICHAEL C. DAWSON, BEHIND THE MULE: RACE AND CLASS IN AFRICAN
AMERICAN POLITICS (1994); PATRICIA GURIN ET AL., HOPE AND INDEPENDENCE: BLACKS'
RESPONSE TO ELECTORAL AND PARTY POLITICS (1989); KATHERINE TATE, FROM PROTEST
TO POLITICS: THE NEW BLACK VOTERS IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS (1993); HANES WALTON,
JR., AFRICAN AMERICAN POWER AND POLITICS: THE POLITICAL CONTEXT VARIABLE
(1997); Mary Herring et al., Pro-black Doesn't Mean Anti-white: The Structure of African
American Group Identity, 61 J. POL. 363, 363-86 (1999).
26. DAWSON, supra note 25, at 10 (referring to this idea as the "black utility heuris-
tic"). For other articulations the theory of linked fate, see GERALD JAYNES & ROBIN M.
WILLIAMS, A COMMON DESTINY: BLACK AND AMERICAN SOCIETY (1989); TATE, supra
note 25.
27. In 1996, nearly 86% of Black respondents in the NBES believed they shared a
fate with other Blacks. KATHERINE TATE, INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL
AND SOCIAL RESEARCH, NATIONAL BLACK ELECTION STUDY (1996), http://
www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR,/STUDY/02029.xml. It is a highly predictive
measure of Black political behavior and attitudes.
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threat to society" to impose the death penalty.28 Or, stated alternatively, it
must answer the question, "Do you think the defendant poses a future
danger?" The CJP found that Whites are more likely than Blacks to view
Black defendants as dangerous.2 9 Racial differences in views on danger-
ousness make the question of Black participation in juries extremely
important, especially for a community that has long battled public percep-
tions that its members are both a physical and social danger.3z
The findings of the CJP suggest the need to look at other aspects of
the jury selection process. The potential impact of the presence of
Blacks-and in some instances their views-in the jury room indicate
that prosecutors may be motivated to remove them. Batson hearings in
capital cases merge the state's attempt to mitigate discrimination in jury
selection with the Court's call for a fair cross-section of views on juries.3'
Focusing on this aspect of jury selection permits analysis of the dialogue
between African Americans and the state about the death penalty and, in
accordance with linked fate theory, African Americans' view of their status
in the larger society.
1I.THE LITIGATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY
SELECTION FROM STRAUDER TO BATSON
A. Strauder and Its Progeny
The ultimate goal of the jury is to allow a defendant's fellow members
of society-or at least those who are not in some way disqualified-to de-
termine whether he or she is guilty or innocent. This goal is commonly
28. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.071, § 2(a)(2)-(b)(1) (Vernon 2009).
29. Bowers et. al, supra note 18, at 1503.
30. The historian Earl Lewis documented attempts by Black advocacy groups such
as the NAACP to transform public narratives of Blacks as a public danger to "injured
citizens." See generally EARL LEWIS, CONSTRUCTING AFRICAN AMERICANS AS MINORITIES,
IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF MINORITIES 15 (Andr6 Burguire & Raymond Crew eds.,
2001). This strategy was part of a collective effort to use public opinion to push for the
expansion of political rights in the post-Reconstruction periods. See id. For a discussion of
how this strategy links with the modern efforts to reframe the death penalty, see generally
Melynda Price, Litigating Salvation: Race, Religion and Innocence in the Cases of Karla Faye
Tucker and Gary Graham, 15 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN' STUD. 267 (2006).
31. Scholars have explored the relationship between representing a fair cross-section
of views on the jury with the participation of racial minorities as jurors. See, e.g., Fukurai,
supra note 12, at 92 ("A comparison of various Supreme Court opinions illustrates that
cross section does not mean a cross section of the community, but only a cross section of
whatever segment of the community is legally designated for jury duty."). Fukurai and his
co-authors point to a gap in the legal designation of who is fit for jury service and the
segments of the community that litigants believe should serve-a gap maintained by the
use of peremptory challenges. See id. See also generally, Adam M. Clark, An Investigation of
Death Qualification as a Violation of the Rights of Jurors, 24 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 1
(2005/2006).
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referred to as a defendant's right to be judged by his or her peers. A de-
fendant's peers are not limited to those who draw directly from his or her
sphere of knowledge, social class, and gender or, of particular relevance to12
this analysis, race. The democratic norms from which the jury system
originates are evident in the way the jury allows all citizens to uphold the
moral and governmental authority of the criminal justice system through
the possibility of jury service. Because of these democratic origins, as
groups become incorporated in the "bounded community of citizen-
ship, 33 systematic bars on their participation in jury service abridge their
rights-and to some degree, their obligations-of citizenship. The men-
tion of juries on more than one occasion in the Constitution highlights
the importance of the jury in the minds of the Framers, but does not set-
tle the question of who is fit for jury service-a question that has been
negotiated in courts and legislatures. 34 This part of the Article looks at the
evolution of legal protections of African Americans' right to participate in
juries and issues that prevent the entrance of African Americans into the
jury panel at all.
The passage of the Civil War Amendments legally granted all African
Americans the rights of citizenship.3" With the rights of citizenship also
32. For a discussion of the history of the meaning of "peers" in jury service and
how that concept has evolved, see Deborah H. Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the Ancient
Custom of De Medietate Linguae, 74 B.U. L. REV. 777, 783-96 (1994).
33. The term, "bounded community," originated from work on the death penalty
in Texas. JAMES MARQUART, SHELDON EKLAND-OLSON & JONATHAN R. SORENSEN, THE
ROPE, THE CHAIR AND THE NEEDLE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN TEXAS, 1923-1990 17
(1994). The term is used to refer to that category of citizens who are free from both legal
and extralegal violence by the state and private citizens. Id.
34. The Constitution mandates that all trials be by jury, except in cases of im-
peachment. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2. Both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments articulate
jury rights in criminal cases. Id. amends. V and VI. The Seventh Amendment provides
the right to ajury trial in certain civil cases. Id. amend. VII.
35. It is always important to mention that some of the rights of citizenship, particu-
larly voting and jury service, were not fully extended to African American women-or
any women-at this time. The tendency to utilize the political and legal status of Black
men as a proxy for all members of the Black community has been criticized by Black
feminists for its failure to note the differential treatment of Black women in political and
scholarly work. See, e.g., BUT SOME OP Us ARE BRAVE: ALL THE WOMEN ARE WHITE, ALL
THE BLACKS ARE MEN: BLACK WOMEN'S STUDIES (Gloria T. Hull et al. eds., 1982). For all
women, the right to participate on juries would not be achieved until the 1970's. For
example, a Louisiana statute excluded women from the jury pool unless they filed a decla-
ration expressing interest to serve. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 523-24 (1975). In
Taylor, the Court found that there were no women on the venire, despite the fact that
they constituted 53 percent of the population in the judicial district. Id. In 1979, the Su-
preme Court overturned a Missouri law that permitted women to be exempted from jury
duty upon request and resulted in only 14.5% of the post-summons venire to be com-
prised of women. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 359-360, 362 (1979). The Supreme
Court did not recognize female jurors of all races as having a right against sex discrimina-
tion in the use of peremptory challenges until 1994. J.E.B. v. Ala. ex rel. T.B. 511 U.S.
127, 143 (1994).
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came access to spaces where laws and values were adjudicated, one of the
most important being the jury. Jim Crow laws, a system implemented by
Whites to maintain the socio-political structure of the Black subjugation
36that began in the slavery period, excluded Blacks from jury service.
States constructed these laws in various ways, and many were litigated to
the Supreme Court with decisions that sometimes protected and some-
times ignored the rights of African Americans created by the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.37
The first critical case involving Black jurors, Strauder v. West Virginia,
was one of the successes in terms of the Court's willingness to protect this
aspect of the African American citizenship rights.38 Strauder, a Black man,
was convicted of murder, and his conviction was upheld by the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court.39 Strauder petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to
overturn his conviction because West Virginia law permitted only White
men to serve on juries. 4" This statute, the defense argued, denied Strauder
of his right to equal protection of the laws. 41 The Court agreed with
Strauder and added that the right to serve on juries was critical to elevat-
ing the citizenship of Blacks to the level of Whites.42 The Court
specifically addressed the connection between racially discriminatory jury
selection rules and the meaning of citizenship, noting:
It is well known that prejudices often exist against particular
classes in the community, which sway the judgment of jurors,
and which, therefore, operate in some cases to deny to persons
of those classes the full enjoyment of that protection which
43
others enjoy.
It should be noted that Strauder does not guarantee a right to have mem-
bers of the defendant's race seated as jurors; it only guarantees that
members of the defendant's race will not be statutorily excluded from the
pool of potential jurors.
36. For a lengthy discussion on the evolution of the construction of the southern
racial hierarchy of Jim Crow, see C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM
CROW (1957), the classic text on the subject; see also GLENDA E. GILMORE, DEFYING
DIXIE: THE RADICAL ROOTS OF CIVIL RIGHTS: 1919-1950 (2008),
37. See, e.g., FUKURAI, supra note 12, at 13-17.
38. Strauder v.WestVirginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306-307 (1880)
39. Id. at 304.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 305.
42. Id. at 308.
43. Id. at 309.
44. Id. at 305 ("It is to be observed that the first of these questions is not whether a
colored man, when an indictment has been preferred against him, has a right to a grand or
a petit jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race or color, but it is
whether, in the composition or selection ofjurors by whom he is to be indicted or tried,
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In 1935, the Supreme Court again addressed the exclusion of quali-
fied Black citizens from jury service. Clarence Norris was one of nine
Black "boys" convicted of rape in Jackson County, Alabama, in 1931. 4s
The Supreme Court reversed Norris's conviction, along with those of six
of the other defendants, because of due process violations in the trial and
remanded the case to the state court for a new trial.46 At the onset of the
second trial, Norris's counsel motioned to quash the indictment and the
trial venire because Blacks were excluded from jury service.47 The trial
judge denied both motions and the jury sentenced Norris to deathY.4
Norris again appealed his sentence to the Supreme Court,49 which held
that the state violated Norris's rights by excluding all Blacks from serving
on his jury.0 The record revealed rampant racial discrimination in jury
administration in the county where Norris's second trial occurred."1 The
Court reiterated a conclusion it drew in Neal v. Delaware over five decades
earlier:
[I]t was ... a 'violent presumption' which the State court in-
dulged, that such uniform exclusion of [the black] race from
juries, during a period of many years, was solely because, in the
judgment of the officers ... 'the black race in Delaware were
utterly disqualified, by want of intelligence, experience, or
moral integrity, to sit on juries.5 2
Despite articulating these rights, Strauder and Norris did not alter the
practice, well into the twentieth century, of systematic exclusion of Afri-
can Americans from juries s3 Strauder, however, represents the beginning of
the continued legal wrangling that connects jury service and other forms
of civic participation to attempts by African Americans to secure their
rights as citizens. 4 The battle for unbiased selection and administration of
all persons of his race or color may be excluded by law, solely because of their race or
color, so that by no possibility can any colored man sit upon the jury.").
45. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 588 (1935).
46. Id. at 588.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 589.
50. Id. at 596-598.
51. Id. at 591-92.
52. Id. at 599 (quoting Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 397 (1880)).
53. See generally FtuKuRAi, supra note 12, at 86-89.
54. In his biography of the Constitution, Akhil Amar couples jury service with the
right to vote and hold and serve in office as the "kindred political rights" omitted from the
Thirteenth Amendment and then necessitating the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment
the following year. AsmR, supra note 17, at 351. Amar emphasizes the need to avoid the
modern tendency to view these political rights as indivisibly tied to each other both in
their political development and legal interpretation. Id. In Amar's view, each "arose in its
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juries has been altered in recent decades by the creation of new mecha-
nisms of policing discriminatory exclusion of racial minorities from jury
service.
B. The Contours of Batson
In Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court addressed the harm to de-
fendants when jurors are seated using discriminatory methods.'- Though
the Supreme Court clearly expressed its desire to prevent states from de-
nying African Americans the right to serve on juries through legislative
restrictions in Strauder, Batson tackled the more complicated issue of the
role race plays in the use of peremptory challenges. In Batson, the Su-
preme Court settled conflict over the correct application of the rule
articulated in Swain v. Alabama, with adjustments to the standards for
demonstrating racial discrimination in peremptory challenges."
In Swain, the Court held that a "State's purposeful or deliberate de-
nial to Negroes on account of race of participation as jurors in the
administration of justice violates the Equal Protection Clause.,17 The
Court further held that peremptory challenges were a necessary part of
the administration of justice.5 s To demonstrate a prima facie case of ra-
cially discriminatory peremptory challenges under Swain, a Black
defendant needed to show not only that he was a member of a cognizable
racial group that could be singled out for differential treatment, but also
evidence of "the prosecutor's systematic use of peremptory challenges
against Negroes over a period of time."' 9 Swain also required defendants
to prove systematic discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges
across multiple trials, which meant that the remedy for discrimination in a
defendant's immediate case was only available on appeal or after exhaus-
tive research on the practices in that jurisdiction.6 °
Due to the high evidentiary standard required to prove constitu-
tional harm, Swain had little practical impact.1 In his concurring opinion
in Swain, Justice Marshall pointed to several examples where defendants
attempted to mount such claims. In one instance, the defendant presented
evidence that in a single year prosecutors in Dallas County, Texas, struck
own unique historical moment; each raised its own set of issues, and in each amendment
battle neither side could know whether additional battles would follow." Id. at 351.
55. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87-88.
56. Id. at 84-86.
57. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,203-04 (1965).
58. Id. at 219.
59. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,494 (1977); Swain, 380 U.S. at 227.
60. Swain, 380 U.S. at 222.
61. In its decision in Batson, the Court cites to the "practical difficulties" faced by
lower courts in the application of Swain. Batson, 476 U.S. at 92 n.17.
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405 out of 467 Black jurors with peremptory challenges . Even this
showing was not sufficient proof of racially motivated peremptory chal-
lenges under Swain.63 The majority of defendants cannot afford the
investigation required to compile the statistics that demonstrate systematic
discrimination. Nevertheless, even if the defendant can gather the evi-
dence, the Dallas County example suggests it may not be sufficient unless
perhaps all Blacks were removed using peremptory challenges.
Nevertheless, because the jury's "central position in our system of
justice" is to "safeguard a person accused of crime against the arbitrary
exercise of power by prosecutor or judge,"Justice Powell's majority opin-
ion argued that racial discrimination in the jury process goes beyond a
violation of the Equal Protection rights of the qualified individual denied
jury service to affect the "entire community" by "undermin[ing] public
confidence in the fairness of our system ofjustice. '6 4
Whereas Strauder and its progeny repeatedly stated that selecting
only Whites to be on the panel of citizens summoned for jury duty-also
called the venire or jury pool-violates the Equal Protection Clause, Bat-
son involved the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. In
selecting which jurors to seat from the venire, each side of the dispute is
allowed to remove a limited number of jurors without showing cause using
challenges based on their subjective discretion.6 ' This type of removal is
called a peremptory challenge. Peremptory challenges acknowledge that
lawyers over time develop certain intuitive strategies-hunches, instincts-
for evaluating whether a juror will be biased or in some way detrimental to
66their case. In Batson, the Court demarcated the line between the prosecu-
tors' historically unfettered right to use their instincts in the form of
peremptory challenges and the purposeful use of race discrimination in
62. Batson, 476 U.S. at 104. The Dallas County Prosecutor used a handbook for
jury selection that encouraged prosecutors to eliminate "any member of a minority
group." Steve McGonigle and Ed Timms, Race Bias Pervades Jury Selection: Prosecutors rou-
tinely bar blacks, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 9, 1986, at 1A, available at http://
www.daflasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/longterm/stories/030986.829cdf8f.html.
An earlier jury-selection treatise circulated in the same county instructed prosecutors:
"Do not take Jews, Negroes, Dagos, Mexicans or a member of any minority race on a
jury, no matter how rich or how well educated." Tompkins v. State, 774 S.W.2d 195,
203 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
63. Batson, 476 U.S. at 104; Swain, 380 U.S. at 228.
64. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86-87.
65. Both the prosecution and the defense are allowed an unlimited number of chal-
lenges "for cause." 47 Am. JUR. 2d Jury § 200. Parties support challenges for cause with a
specific reason that can automatically remove a juror. Id. Whether a reason is sufficient to
automatically remove a juror frequently depends on whether the court determines there is
suitable reason for the person to be biased. 47 AM.Jut. 2dJury § 202.
66. 1 say prosecutors here because Batson is silent as to the racially discriminatory
use of peremptory challenges by the defense. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 n.12. Also, this
analysis focuses on the interaction between Black citizens and the state as represented by
the prosecutor.
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peremptory challenges. 7 The Court connected the constitutional bar on
legislation excluding minorities from the venire to racially discriminatory
peremptory challenges because of the importance of peremptory chal-
lenges in selecting the trial jury."' The significance of peremptory
challenges in jury selection makes them necessarily subject to constitu-
69tional review.
The majority opinion in Batson directs much of its focus to the lat-
ter part of the Court's decision in Swain.7 ° The amount of time and effort
Swain required of defendants to object to a discriminatory peremptory
challenge made it an often insurmountable obstacle to making a success-
ful objection. Batson created a new process for evaluating the use of
peremptory challenges against racial minorities the instant they oc-
curred."
Batson lessened the level of proof necessary to make a showing of
discrimination and particularized the inquiry such that defendants only
need to show racial discrimination by the prosecutor in the case instantly
before the court.. Defendants no longer need to prove discrimination
across multiple cases and over time. According to the new rule articulated
in Batson, to make a showing of racial bias in the prosecutor's use of per-
emptory challenges, defendants must demonstrate three things: 1) That
they are a "member of a cognizable racial group, 72 and "that the prosecu-
tor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire
members of the defendant's race;" 2) That "peremptory challenges consti-
tute a jury selection practice that permits "those to discriminate who are
of a mind to discriminate;, 73 and 3) That these facts and other "relevant
circumstances raise an inference" that the prosecutor used peremptory
67. Id. at 91 ("The Court sought to accommodate the prosecutor's historical privi-
lege of peremptory challenge free of judicial control and the constitutional prohibition on
exclusion of persons from jury service on account of race.") (citation omitted).
68. Id. at 99 ("By requiring trial courts to be sensitive to the racially discriminatory
use of peremptory challenges, our decision enforces the mandate of equal protection and
furthers the ends ofjustice.").
69. Id. at 89 ("Accordingly, the component of the jury selection process at issue
here, the State's privilege to strike individual jurors through peremptory challenges, is
subject to the commands of the Equal Protection Clause.").
70. The Batson majority mentions Swain more than forty times. Batson, 476 U.S. at
89.
71. Id. at 129 ("Prosecutors and defense attorneys alike will build records in support
of their claims that peremptory challenges have been exercised in a racially discriminatory
fashion.").
72. This part of the rule was first articulated in Castaneda. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at
494-95.
73. This part of the rule is now considered an indisputable factor in the legal analy-
sis of the use of peremptory challenges to remove of racial minorities.
[VOL. 15:57
Peremptory Challenges
challenges to remove members of the defendant's race from the trial
jury.
The result of these requirements is what is in practice referred to as
the Batson hearing. In Batson hearings, the defendant's lawyer can object if
he or she believes the prosecutor is using peremptory challenges to strike
jurors based on race. As soon as a lawyer objects, the proceedings halt. The
trial judge then questions the prosecutor as to his or her reasons for strik-
ing the Black jurors in question with peremptory challenges. The
prosecutor must then articulate race neutral reasons for the removals.5
Though on opposite sides of the Batson holding, Justices Marshall and
Rehnquist both predicted what would later become the clear problem
with Batson: proving intentional racial discrimination is very difficult.
7 6
In his concurring opinion, Justice Marshall went further than any
other member of the Court at that time by stating that the elimination of
peremptory challenges is the only solution to discriminatory uses of per-
emptory challenges 7 Marshall echoed the Court's holding that the use of
peremptory challenges to remove Blacks from juries violates the Equal
Protection Clause. Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, defended peremptory
challenges as a historic and valued tool for legal practitioners. In his view,
as long as peremptory challenges are used to remove jurors of all races in
cases where the defendant's and the juror's race are the same, then there is
no equal protection problem because Blacks are not singled out.78 The
prosecutor's decision to peremptorily challenge a venireperson is at "best
based upon seat-of-the-pants instincts," which Rehnquist acknowledges
may be "crudely stereotypical and may in many cases be hopelessly mis-
taken," but are acceptable if the mistake is made across racial lines.
7 9
Marshall directly addressed this point, arguing that "'seat-of-the-pants'
instincts may often be just another term for racial prejudice."8" Marshall
suggested that "even if all parties approach the Court's mandate with the
best of conscious intentions," individuals possess subconscious racism on
which these "instincts" might be based. It requires a high a level of aware-
ness for courts and prosecutors to perceive and overcome the effect of
74. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
75. Id. at 98 ("The prosecutor therefore must articulate a neutral explanation re-
lated to the particular case to be tried.").
76. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 105 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("[D]efendants cannot
attack the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges at all unless the challenges are so
flagrant as to establish a prima facie case."); Id. at 127-28 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
("Anything short of a challenge for cause may well be seen as an 'arbitrary and capricious'
challenge ....").
77. Id. at 103.
78. Id. at 112.
79. Id. at 138 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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their unconscious bias. Marshall doubted the ability of individuals to
meet these standards and arguments in this Article suggest additional rea-
sons for continued skepticism. In Marshall's view, the potential for racial
bias in peremptory challenges is so high that they should be discontin-
ued. 82
Though Marshall and Rehnquist argued for completely opposite
resolutions in Batson, their positions forecasted the resulting complications
of the decision. Prosecutors do indeed rely on instincts and past experi-
81. To maintain race neutrality in making peremptory challenges, litigators must
not only be highly self-aware of possible racial bias, as Justice Marshall suggests, but also
able to racially categorize venire members using only visual assessments. Race is not a
question on the juror form in most, which means litigators and courts must determine a
juror's race on their own. Much scholarly attention has been given to the notion that race
is a social construction. This view of race can be extremely powerful when assessing the
structural policies and views that shape the meaning of race, but this idea often becomes
problematic when very real and pragmatic applications turn on whether or not a person
falls within a constructed racial category. The rule of hypo-descent or the "one drop rule"
and the sexual politics of both ante and post-bellum America often required mixed race
offspring to be designated as the race of the racially "subordinate" parent. See generally F.
JAMES DAVIS, WHO IS BLACK?: ONE NATION'S DEFINITION (2001), WHO IS BLACK?: ONE
NATION'S DEFINITION (2001). The wide array of phenotypes among African Americans
can make visual determinations tricky for the keenest eye. Upon hearing the subject of
this Article, a Lexington, Kentucky district court judge, Lewis Paisley, relayed the follow-
ing story: In a case with a Black defendant, a Black defense attorney, and a White
prosecutor, the defense attorney raised a Batson objection. The judge had the attorneys
step forward. At the bench, there was some confusion as to why a Batson objection was
raised for that particular juror. After some back and forth between the defense attorney
and the prosecutor on the race of the juror prompting the objection, they reached a
stalemate, with the Black attorney exclaiming that he knew a Black man when he saw
one. The White attorney exclaimed that he too could identify members of his own racial
group when he saw them. The juror at issue did not participate at all in this conflict. The
district court judge-who is White and was also unsure of the juror's racial identity-
could not recall the resolution of the objection. Even without the ending, this story pro-
vides anecdotal evidence of the difficulty of the initial step of racial identification required
by Batson. This issue was also raised in the CCA In Gibson v. Texas. In response to a Bat-
son challenge, the state claimed that the defendant failed to make a prima facie case by not
proving that the jurors, whose differential treatment formed the basis of the objection,
were of different races. Gibson v. Texas, 144 S.W.3d 530, 533 n.4 (Tex. Crim. App.
2004). Both these examples highlight the information deficits that exist in these situations.
These problems are amplified when a racial identification is based on the subjective de-
termination of every participant, including clerks, except the juror. An appellate court
only has the record before them. The confusion around identification shows the com-
plexity ofjust the first step in the evaluation of Batson claims. To then ask litigants to be
aware of and then reveal racial biases that might inhibit the fair selection of a jury seems
to ask for more than is possible. Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 ("Even if all parties approach the
Court's mandate with the best of conscious intentions, that mandate requires them to
confront and overcome their own racism on all levels-a challenge I doubt all of them
can meet.").
82. Batson, 476 U.S. at 108 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("However, only by banning
peremptories entirely can such discrimination be ended.").
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ence to make decisions about which jurors would be best for the state.
Peremptory challenges allow both sides to remove jurors based on those
qualities that do not amount to cause for removal, but arouse certain un-
ease in the litigant about a juror's presence on this particular jury.
However, in assessing the suitability of a juror for service, lawyers some-
times base decisions on generalization about racial minorities and their
perspectives. If racial bias could be overcome by asking the lawyers if their
challenges were racially motivated, then the shallowness of the current
investigations into the reasons offered by prosecutors would be satisfac-
tory and Justice Marshall's concerns about intentional deception and
masked racism an unnecessary cautionary tale. 84 Later decisions on Batson
related claims seem to suggest ad hominem that trial courts will be able to
see through "implausible or fantastic justifications.' 85  However, African
Americans continue to be underrepresented in jury pools, with explana-
tions for this phenomena ranging from low levels of desire to participate
among African Americans, to structural obstacles, such as the exclusive use
of voter registration roles instead of driver's license records to select veni-86
repersons. In recent years, felon disenfranchisement-the loss of
citizenship rights due to criminal convictions-has become another im-
portant structural obstacle for African Americans in the jury process."' The
structural obstacles now limiting African American participation may
overwhelm the Supreme Court's attempts to curb discrimination in other
parts of the jury selection process.
83. It should be noted again that both prosecutors and defense attorneys use per-
emptory challenges in race-conscious ways. Samuel Gross argues that "[iut has been
common knowledge for decades that prosecutors and defense attorneys use race as a basis
for deciding which potential jurors to challenge and which to accept." Samuel R. Gross,
Race, Peremptories and Capital Jury Deliberation, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 283, 288 (2001). This
common use by prosecutors and defense attorney does not negate the individual responsi-
bility to utilize constitutional practices.
84. Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 ("If such easily generated explanations are sufficient to
discharge the prosecutor's obligation to justify his strikes on nonracial grounds, then the
protection erected by the Court today may be illusory.").
85. See, e.g., Purket v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-68 (1995) ("The second step of
this process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible.").
86. Several efforts have been made to increase the representativeness ofjury pools.
These efforts include using voter registration rolls and drivers license records to access the
names of potential jurors. For a more detailed discussion, see FUKARAI, supra note 12, at
40-68.
87. See, e.g., KHALILAH BROWN-DEAN, Pernanent Outsiders: Felon Disenfranchisement
and the Breakdown of Black Politics, in THE EXPANDING BOUNDARIES OF BLACK POLITICS
103 (Georgia A. Persons ed., 2007).
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III. BATSON HEARINGS AS RITUAL IN CAPITAL CASES:
THEORY AND PRACTICE
Across time and disciplines, the definition of ritual has varied. This
Article draws on the writing of the sociologist Robert Wuthnow, who in
his extensive career has demonstrated the linkages between culture, relig-
ion, morality and meaning in American social structures, including the
law."' In Meaning and Moral Order: Explorations in Cultural Analysis, Wuth-
now defines ritual as "a symbolic-expressive aspect of behavior that
communicates something about social relations, often in relatively dra-
matic or formal manner.' ' 9
Actions, for Wuthnow, are symbolic "if they stand for something
else" or "if they communicate meanings rather than being performed for
purely practical or instrumental purposes."9° The activities that make up
ritual have meanings that go beyond superficial performances. 91 Regard-
ing the motives and intentions of actors in a ritual,Wuthnow states, "ritual
provides an occasion for making public what one thinks, feels, or intends
to do.' 92 The most fundamental role of ritual is to regulate and define so-
cial relations.93 Ritual does this by making boundaries between social
groups clear, by reminding participants of their relationships, or by send-
ing signals concerning social positions. 94 Wuthnow compares ritual to a
"thermostat," giving "feedback about how to regulate behavior so as to
better attain the collective goals of that behavior."9'
Previous scholarship, by others and me, theorizes that the death pen-
alty is a way of regulating behavior and defining community
membership. 96 Wuthnow's concept of ritual shows that Batson hearings
function similarly. Through the fixed performance in the trial process,
courts aim to prevent racially motivated removal ofjurors. The defendant
objects to the prosecutor's removal of African American jurors using per-
emptory challenges. The proceedings pause. The prosecutor offers race
neutral reasons for the removals. The judge affirms or denies those reasons.
88. For a bibliography of Robert Wuthnow's substantial writing in this area, see
Robert Wuthnow, http://www.princeton.edu/-wuthnow/publications.html (last visited
Oct. 11, 2009).
89. ROBERT WUTHNOW, MEANING AND MORAL ORDER: EXPLORATIONS IN CUL-
TURAL ANALYSIS 109 (1987) (emphasis omitted).
90. Id. at 99.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 104. Note that the "one" to which Wuthnow refers is not necessarily the
individual but also includes institutional actors like the state.
93. Id. at 107.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See generally TIMOTHY V. KAUFMAN-OSBORN, FROM NOOSE TO NEEDLE: CAPI-
TAL PUNISHMENT AND THE LATE LIBERAL STATE (2002); MARQUART ET AL., supra, note 34;
Price, supra note 30.
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The trial continues. With Batson hearings, courts now have a process that
serves as an active affirmation of the non-discriminatory selection of ju-
ries. The law requires judges and legal counsel to act out, in dramatic
fashion, this process, as a way of communicating that race is not a factor in
peremptory challenges. In this very same action, courts can ignore the
unconstitutional use of race in peremptory challenges.
Wuthnow argues that each participant in a ritual plays his or her
role to those that have some allegiance-political, philosophical, or
moral-with him or her. The state, represented simultaneously by the
prosecutor and the court, communicates a certain set of values to those
who are allied with the state and its policies, which, in this instance, in-
clude the death penalty. The defendant communicates a certain position
to those in his or her community. I do not argue that these alliances break
evenly along racial lines, but the disproportionate role of African Ameri-
cans as defendants and dismissed members of the venire suggests that the
state views African Americans as being allied with those who oppose the
state and its policies on the death penalty.
97
How does the viewer of the Batson ritual know that it has fulfilled
its role of preventing racially motivated peremptory challenges? The
viewer-whether it be society, the defense attorney, the dismissed juror, or
a court clerk-knows because the prosecutor publicly declares in the au-
thoritative space of the courtroom the absence of motives animated by
race in the removals in question. Our understanding of the physical space
in which these hearings take place should not be limited to the court-
rooms or the courthouses in which these courtrooms are located, nor the
audience to litigants and jurors. These courtrooms and courthouses, as
well as the people, are located in a legal, political and cultural context that
97. I interviewed a Black prosecutor in Harris County who argued that the death
penalty is not skewed toward particular racial groups and the sentence is only dispensed
when the crime warrants it. The prosecutor explains with the following:
Well, they say if you're a black, okay, you're on automatic rail to death row.
That's not so! ... nobody got an advantage going here. It's simply because
you are-I'm saying we get just as many White occasions of death sentence
that I've seen them give other.
Interview with Black Harris County Prosecutor (Houston,Tex., August 15, 2004). He holds this
belief despite public opinion polls in Houston finding that 78.9% of African Americans in
his jurisdiction believed that the death penalty is not applied fairly across racial lines.
Turner Allan, A deadly distinction: Bloodthirsty image at odds with local polls, Hous. CHRON.,
Feb. 04, 2001, at Al. By comparison, only 38.9% of Whites believed the death penalty was
racially biased. Id. These disparate views among African Americans and between African
Americans and Whites show that race is an important but not a determinative factor in
how a person views the death penalty. A new study by a sociologist at the University of
Denver also found a direct link between race and the death sentence, holding all other
factors-e.g., race of the victim, crime-constant. Scott Phillips, Race in the Capital of
Capital Punishment, 45 Hous. L. REv. 807 (2008).
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is steeped in the practices, traditions, and values of the people and land-
scape on which they stand.
The legal, political and cultural backdrop in which the hearings ana-
lyzed here occur is one where race and racism have been, at times,
determinative and continue to be factors in the way in which the death
penalty is administered. Texas is ground zero for capital trials and convic-
tions. The citizens of the state of Texas may not each be privy to the
individual proceedings in capital cases, but they are aware that they occur
and of the eventual executions, and they are clearly members of the Batson
ritual's audience. Despite the history of the state and the well-documented
discriminatory practices of its agents, the CCA has only found the prosecu-
tion's use of peremptory challenges to violate the constitutional rule
articulated in Batson in a limited number of cases. 98 The decisions of this
highest Texas criminal court have, however, gone to the Supreme Court
and forced it to more clearly define the relationship between peremptory
challenges and constitutionally prohibited uses of race.99 To some degree,
one can witness the development of Batson hearings and their ritualization
in this space. The courts, the agents, and those persons of color who have
been unconstitutionally removed from juries in this state are a critical
community for understanding these hearings.
For almost two decades, the Dallas County Prosecutor's Office used
a training manual as part of its official practices that instructed prosecutors
to remove "any member of a minority group which may subject him to
oppression" because "[members of oppressed groups] almost always sym-
pathize with the accused."'00 The Dallas Morning News published a study
in 1986 that found, as a result of the Dallas County Prosecutor's policies,
only 2.8% of the jurors on capital murder cases were Black and prosecu-
98. Between 1987 and 2006 only one case was overturned on Batson grounds by the
CCA. Chambers, 742 S. W. 2d 695. Prosecutors' use of manuals that directed prosecutors
in Dallas County, Texas to utilize race and other constitutionally prohibited factors is
discussed in an earlier footnote. See discussion supra note 64. A study by the Texas De-
fender Service, a non-profit legal defense organization, published the testimony of several
former prosecutors from Harris County and counties around the state who witnessed such
practices post-Batson. See TEXAS DEFENDER SERVICE, A STATE OF DENIAL: TEXAS JUSTICE
AND THE DEATH PENALTY 54-59 (2007), http://www.texasdefender.org/publications.asp
(last visited Sept. 12, 2008).
99. Batson and Miller-El are only recent examples of the involvement of Texas state
courts in the evolution of constitutional law on jury discrimination. As early as 1940, the
U.S. Supreme Court overturned unanimously a Texas statute that systematically excluded
Blacks from juror lists. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 132 (1940). In Smith, the court
used statistical analysis to show that in Harris County, where the defendant was convicted,
the population of African Americans numbered more than twenty percent. Id. at 128-29.
Despite the estimated three to six thousand Blacks eligible, only five were seated on grand
juries between 1931 and 1938. Id. at 129. Snith began nearly six decades of the Supreme
Court's attempt to regulate and rectify racial discrimination injury selection in Texas.
100. See also Batson, 476 U.S. at 104 n.3 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting
newspaper article).
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tors used peremptory challenges to strike an amazing 92% of Black ju-
rors." It is not known how long the office maintained this unofficial
policy.0 2 Other counties in Texas also used such practices, and stated them
explicitly in training manuals 03 Harris County, which covers most of
Houston, also engaged in such practices0 4 and, if only informally, institu-
tionalized the removal of racial and religious minorities with peremptory
challenges.' 0' Studies demonstrate that prosecutors in other jurisdictions
intentionally used peremptory challenges to remove from juries African
Americans, as well as Latinos,Jews and the disabled.
0 6
Recent litigation reaffirms the importance of Texas courts in the
evolution of the Batson ritual.0 7 In Miller-El, the Supreme Court returned
to the practices of the Dallas County District Attorney's office and the
CCA's evaluation of Batson error. 00 Miller-El stands as the current standard
for evaluating the constitutionality of peremptory challenges. The inter-
pretive approach that grows out of Miller-El is best captured in the Court's
urging of lower courts to look at "broader practices" during the jury se-
lection. Miller-El also shows that Batson hearings, without significant
101. Id.
102. In 2006, the DALLAS MORNING NEWS revisited jury strikes in Dallas County, a
jurisdiction that has been a constant presence in peremptory challenges cases. Steve McGo-
nigle, Holly Becka, Jennifer La Fleur and Tim Wyatt, Jurors race a focal point for defense: Rival
lawyers reject whites at a higher rate, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 24, 2006 available at
http://www.daflasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/longterm/stories/082105dnproprose
cutors.378d9eb.htnml.
103. Similar practices were found in other Texas counties as well. See, e.g., Ex parte
Brandley, 781 S.W.2d. 886, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
104. In 2008 the Harris County district attorney resigned after sending e-mails that
included racist jokes and jokes about the cases involving Black defendants prosecuted by
his office. Ralph Blumenthal, Prosecutor, Under Fire, Steps Down in Houston, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 16, 2008, at A10. This suggests that the tenor of racially biased thinking continues to
exist in prosecutors' offices in Texas. This event only reinforces the continued need for
procedures more effective than Batson hearings.
105. The Texas Defender Service, a non-profit legal defense organization, published
study including the testimony of several former prosecutors from Harris County and
counties around the state who witnessed such practices post-Batson. See, TEXAS DEFENDER
SERVICE, supra note 98.
106. See, TEXAS DEFENDER SERVICE, supra note 99. In addition to the study of peremp-
tory challenges in that jurisdiction undertaken by the Dallas Morning News, other studies
revealed similar patterns in other locations. In a review of capital cases from the mid to
late 1970s in Florida, patterns of racial discrimination in peremptory challenges are evi-
dent. Bruce J. Winick, Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge Practices in Capital Cases: An
Empirical Study and a Constitutional Analysis, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1, 39 (1982). This study
was followed by studies on other states. See generally Baldus et al., supra note 10; Rose,
supra note 10, Turner, supra note 10; Becka et al., supra note 10.
107. In 1985, an all-White jury sentenced Thomas Miller-El to death after the
prosecutor dismissed ten qualified Black jurors by peremptory challenge. Miller-El v.
Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005). The trial court found under Swain, the guiding case at the
time, no evidence of "systematic exclusion of blacks as a matter of policy." Id. at 236.
108. Id. at 236-37.
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investigation and motivation by the lower courts, often fail in their pur-
pose of preventing discrimination, while succeeding in permitting
unconstitutional death sentences. Miller-El calls for analysis of the cultural
context in which the strikes occur. These include, for instance, the racist
history and practices of the Dallas County District Attorney, a compara-
tive analysis of differences in treatment between those jurors seated and
those removed-for instance, a comparison of Blacks and Whites in the
venire-and attention to what is physically taking place in the court-
room-for instance, jury shuffles.'0 9 I, like Justice Souter-who wrote for
the majority-focus this section of the Article on two of the practices the
prosecution in Miller-El used to select the jury because they clearly dem-
onstrate the state's expressive and dramatic communication of who is not
a fit juror in capital cases: The first is known in Texas as the jury shuffle;
the second is the provision of different prefatory statements about the
death penalty to Black andWhite members of the venire panel."0
The jury shuffle allows either party to request that the clerk of the
court literally shuffle the cards bearing the jurors' names."' In Miller-El, a
number of the Black jurors were seated at the beginning of the panel, so
the prosecutor requested a shuffle, moving the Blacks at the beginning to
the end. ' 2 The prosecution and the defense spent the next few weeks
shuffling the venire panel in a kind of legal musical chairs, trying to move
Blacks to or from the front of the panel. 1 3 I do not argue that the Black
members of this venire are the metaphorical Rosa Parks of jury selection
being forced to the rear of a different bus. The front and back of the
courtroom or beginning and end of the line are really irrelevant. What is
relevant is that, despite the legal commitments and rules in place to pre-
vent racial discrimination, the trial court permits, the prosecutors request,
109. Id. at 252-66.
110. See, e.g., id. at 253 ("The first clue to the prosecutors' intentions, distinct from
the peremptory challenges themselves, is their resort during voir dire to a procedure
known in Texas as the jury shuffle."); id. at 255 ("Some of these prefatory statements
were cast in general terms, but some followed the so-called graphic script, describing the
method of execution in rhetorical and clinical detail.").
111. The procedure is conducted under TEX. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 35.11
(Vernon Supp. 2004-05).
112. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 254.
113. The record reflects that both the prosecution and defense asked for shuffles. Id.
The Court found the fact that the defense actually asked for more shuffles than the prose-
cution irrelevant. Id. at 255 n. 14. Justice Souter wrote that the uses of the jury shuffle by
the defense did not negate a suspicion of racial discrimination on the part of the prosecu-
tor. Id.
Discrimination by prosecutors is distinct from discrimination by the defense in
these shuffles because of the prosecutor's role as the state's agent-a difference the Court
also acknowledged. Id. at 254. Akhil Amar argues that racially motivated peremptory chal-
lenges, "even in the hands of a defendant, violate the Fifteenth Amendment." Akhil Reed
Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Refonns, 28 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1169, 1178
(1995).
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and everyone participates in literally moving the entire panel around the
courtroom in an attempt to consistently position Blacks for exclusion.
The whole performance pivots around the state's desire to exclude Blacks
rather than to select a fair jury. The second practice in Miller-El that re-
veals this dramatic and expressive desire for exclusion is the prosecutors'
use of different prefatory statements for Blacks and Whites when describ-
ing the juror's role in capital trials. The prosecution made statements to
the jurors just prior to questioning their personal views on the death pen-
alty.' Ninety-four percent ofWhite jurors heard the following:
I feel like it [is] only fair that we tell you our position in this
case.The State of Texas ... is actively seeking the death penalty
in this case for Thomas Joe Miller-El. We anticipate that we
will be able to present to a jury the quantity and type of evi-
dence necessary to convict him of capital murder and the
quantity and type of evidence sufficient to allow a jury to an-
swer these three questions over here in the affirmative."'
However, fifty-three percent of African American venire members and six
percent of the White venire members heard the following more "graphic"
statement:
I feel like you have a right to know right up front what our
position is. Mr. Kinne, Mr. Macaluso and myself, representing
the people of Dallas County and the state of Texas, are actively
seeking the death penalty for Thomas Joe Miller-E .... We do
that with the anticipation that ... at some point Mr. Thomas
Joe Miller-El-the man sitting right down there-will be
taken to Huntsville and will be put on death row and at some
point taken to the death house and placed on a gurney and in-
jected with a lethal substance until he is dead as a result of the
proceedings that we have in this court on this case.16
The state argued the prefatory statements provided were not based on
race, but on the jurors' ambivalence toward the death penalty in an at-
tempt to expose jurors who were "uncertain" about the death penalty.'7
However, differential treatment of Black and White jurors to ensure the
exclusion of one group communicates to those in the excluded group
that the state views them as less valuable both as jurors and as citizens
whose rights are worthy of state protection.
Prosecutors frequently offer ambivalence about the death penalty on
the part of African American members of the venire as a race neutral
114. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 255 (citation omitted).
115. Id. at 255-56.
116. Id. at 256 (citations omitted).
117. Id. at 256-57.
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reason for use of peremptory strikes, as the capital cases discussed later in
this Article demonstrate. However, in Miller-El the Court found this rea-
son did not fit the facts of the case, given that Black jurors were more
likely to hear the latter "graphic" statement about the death penalty than
Whites regardless of their opinion on the death penalty." " That is, even if
the Court based its analysis only on ambivalent jurors, Black ambivalent
jurors were still more likely to be presented with the more graphic state-
ments. '"9 The Court concluded that the behavior of the prosecutors in the
Miller-El jury selection coupled with the Dallas County Prosecutor's his-
tory of racially discriminatory jury practices was more than sufficient to
warrant reversing the state court and granting Miller-El relief.
12 0
In his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer outlined the way "bar
journals," "trial consulting firms," and "materials" from legal organization
have more broadly systematized "the use of race and gender-based stereo-
types in the jury-selection."'' 2' These efforts to train litigators in jury
selection today may be doing more than any single handbook in one
prosecutor's office could have done to entrench discriminatory practices
in the use of peremptory challenges. I echo Justice Breyer's suggestion in
his concurrence that Miller-El only further exemplifies the difficulties of
proving that a prosecutor's motives are race neutral when using peremp-
tory challenges.Y2 2 The Supreme Court reaffirmed the view that one must
look beyond the dialogue between attorney and juror to determine
118. It is important to note that the differences between the majority and minority
opinions in Miller-El turn on the Justices' different characterizations of the venire members'
responses to the jury questionnaire. The majority opinion in footnote 17 said as much
with the following:
The dissent has conducted a similar statistical analysis that it contends sup-
ports the State's argument that the graphic script was used to expose the true
feelings of jurors who professed ambivalence about the death penalty on
their questionnaires. A few examples suffice to show that the dissent's con-
clusions rest on characterizations of panel members' questionnaire responses
that we consider implausible.
Id. at 258 n.17 (citation omitted). The fact that the Court, with the primary responsibility
for articulating the rules on the use of peremptory challenges, was divided on how the
individual responses of jurors should be interpreted is telling of the vagaries involved in
evaluating claims of discrimination in the peremptory challenges.
119. Id. at 258.
120. Id. at 264-66.
121. Id. at 270-72 (Breyer, J., concurring).
122. Id. at 267 ("To begin with, this case illustrates the practical problems of proof
that Justice Marshall described."). This point first brought to the Court's attention by
Justice Marshall in Swain. 380 U.S. at 220-22.
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whether race has been used impermissibly in selecting a capital jury in
2008.23
One attorney summarized the futility of Batson claims in Texas
courts with the following statement:
The state doesn't have to worry about coming up with Batson
excuses anymore because it is not politically popular to do
anything for a defendant, so the objection is never going to be
sustained .... And, if the appeals courts do anything to uphold
the law, they know the CCA [Court of Criminal Appeals] will
overturn them.
24
Between 1987 and 2006 only one case was overturned on Batson grounds
by the CCA.'25 The disparate use of peremptory challenges against African
Americans is not unique to Texas despite its consistent presence in litiga-
tion. Studies in Florida, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania
point to the disproportionate use of peremptory challenges against
Blacks.' 26 The role of these hearings as a safety net against racial discrimi-
nation in jury selection has failed, leaving significant disparities in the
number of African Americans on capital juries.
Wuthnow provides us with the logical next question: the meanings
and definition of social status. This is not the first application of the con-
cept of ritual to the study of the death penalty. Prior analysis focused on
the execution itself1 27 In the study of race and the ritualistic nature of
executing, authors suggest that Black bodies-especially Black, male bod-
ies-make a better sacrifice at the altar of state power.1 28 I suggest that the
analysis of the ritualistic nature of capital punishment needs to be applied
at much earlier stages in the process, so that we can see the diffuse ways in
which African Americans' dysfunctional relationship with the state mani-
fests itself. The symbolic and literal meaning of the death penalty for
123. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 482-486 (2008) (examining the dialogue
between prosecutor and the venireperson as well as other aspects of selection, including
the handling of other jurors who offered similar testimony).
124. Interview by the Texas Defender Service with Fred Tinsley, private defense
attorney (Sept. 30, 2000), in TEXAS DEFENDER SERVICE, supra note 98, at 58. To com-
pletely understand this perspective, it is important to mention that judges in Texas,
including those on the highest courts, are elected through partisan elections. Id.
125. See Chambers, 742 S.W.2d 695.
126. Baldus et al., supra note 106, at 23-29 (offering studies before and after Batson
that all point to the decreased representation of Blacks on juries due in large part to dis-
criminatory peremptory challenges).
127. See, e.g., KAUFMAN-OSBOURN, supra note 96, at 141-42, 173.
128. Id. at 173 ("Arguably today, African American bodies, especially if male, are
best able to do so, at least within the confines of the United States. In such cases, the
ultimate sacrifice is exacted from persons whose antecedent marginalization marks them as
beings whose elimination from the body politic will reconsolidate ... the dominant col-
lective identity presently under assault by forces the state can no longer contain.").
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African Americans goes beyond the killing of Black bodies to being a
constant factor in shaping the very definition of African American citi-
zenship and consequently, their inclusion in deliberative spaces like juries.
IV. BATSON HEARINGS IN TEXAS CAPITAL CASES AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
A RITUAL: A DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODOLOGY AND THE DATA
This Article surveys capital cases drawn from the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeal ("CCA"), a court whose decisions have been influential
in the creation and maintenance of the ritual of Batson hearings both
within the state of Texas and nationwide. The cases date from 1986-
immediately after the Batson decision-to 2006. This Article focuses
largely on the cases that made it to the CCA for several reasons. First, the
CCA is the final arbiter of the correct application of the Supreme Court's
decisions at the state level. Second, because of the number of capital cases
adjudicated in this state, Texas courts have an increased opportunity to
oversee capital jury selection and Batson claims in the context of capital
cases. Last, focusing on cases in the CCA allows for analysis of the cases
that would be the models for all the lower state courts.
Several cases are not included in this analysis. Many of the early de-
cisions by the CCA involving discriminatory usage of peremptory
challenges following the Supreme Court decision in Batson v. Kentucky
simply worked out the legal reasoning and the mechanics of how a trial
court should behave when these objections are raised.'2 9 So for example,
questions on the proper timing of the objection or the exact make-up of
a sufficient record dominate these opinions. Because of the CCA's con-
cern for the mechanics of this new legal process, the opinions include
very little about the jurors themselves or the prosecutors' reasoning. Cases
that were remanded to the lower court for construction of a sufficient
record to rule on the Batson objections are included upon their return to
the CCA. Lastly, some cases are excluded because, although they involved
Black jurors, the legal issue centered on another aspect of the venireper-
sons' identity, such as country of origin.'
3
129. Many of the cases where the appellant was convicted either immediately prior
to or after Batson were remanded to the trial court with instructions on how to proceed
when these new objections are raised. See, e.g., DeBlanc v. Texas, 732 S.W.2d 640, 642
(Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Keeton v. Texas, 724 S.W.2d 58, 66-67 (Tex. Crim. App.
1987).
130. See, e.g., Wamget v. Texas, 67 S.W.3d 851, 859-60 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)
(upholding the prosecutor's assertion that venirepersons who were from places where
violence was quite frequent like New York City or Liberia could be removed based on
geography, despite a bar against removing person strictly because they are naturalized
citizens). There may be some connection between geographic exclusion and race but that
is outside of the scope of this project.
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In the analysis that follows, a prosecutor's reasons offered as race
neutral during the Batson hearing, any first person statements from veni-
repersons and objections by the defense council are extracted from the
cases with a sufficient record. In some cases, the decisions involved a Black
venireperson responding to questions in voir dire followed by the prose-
cutor's interpretations of the venireperson's response and explanations as
to why this response made the person a poor candidate for jury service.
The prosecutors' statements are important because they are the street-
level agents of the state in the implementation of the death penalty. These
interactions in the jury selection process are also of interest to this project
because it explores the contemporary dialogue among African Americans
and the state about the death penalty and the implications of this dialogue
for African Americans' relationship with the post-Civil Rights state.
Noticeably absent from this analysis are judges and their role in
these hearings. The argument could be made that the real gatekeepers in
the process are judges, while prosecutors and defense counsel merely play
their appropriate roles in the adversarial process. In the end it is the judge
who decides whether prosecutors' reasons are race neutral. I believe this
argument flawed because judges are limited in their ability to referee
claims of.Batson discrimination and other work suggests that if they were
not limited, the amount time dedicated to such questions would be lim-
ited. This work focuses on the decision-making of an appellate court, but
previous studies analyzed the implementation of higher court decisions at
the lower court level. In a review of nearly 1700 cases, Feely concluded
from the miniscule amount of time spent reviewing constitutional issues
in lower courts that "the courtroom encounter was a ritual in which the
judge ratified a decision made earlier."' 13 Furthermore it is difficult for
courts to undertake all the requirements of review outlined in Batson and
its progeny-particularly the comparative analysis required by Miller-El-
contemporaneous with the immediate judgments of race neutrality in
each individual voir dire.
A. "I Believe injustice": The Voir Dire Response
of African American Jurors
When asked her views on the death penalty, a juror in the DeBlanc
responded, "I believe in justice."' 132 This juror's response is interesting be-
cause of the particularly heinous nature of the crime in that case-David
DeBlanc was convicted of murdering a Catholic Priest in the parish rec-
tory.133 All the African Americans in the venire were removed using
131. MALCOM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT 11 (1979).
132. DeBlanc, 799 S.W.2d at 711.
133. In March of 2005, DeBlanc's sentence was commuted to life, along with a
number of other death row inmates, after the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the
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peremptory challenges for similar reasons. There is no prohibition against
using peremptory challenges against jurors who oppose the death penalty,
however, the consistency with which these reasons are offered to remove
Black jurors call into question findings of race neutrality. When asked to
articulate their views of the death penalty, the responses of Black jurors
fell into two categories: first, they were ambivalent about the death pen-
alty; and second, they were familiar with a defendant. Though they did
not all personally know the defendant in the particular case, Black venire-
persons had a familiarity with other "defendants," due to relatives or
friends who had been entangled in the criminal justice system. These two
reasons reverberate through all the cases.
Across all the cases, African American responses to questioning in
voir dire fell into at least one of these categories and, in most cases, drew
from both categories. The first and most common response by African
Americans when questioned about the death penalty was ambivalence.
1 4
The majority of the African American venirepersons in this set of cases
expressed feelings ranging from hesitation to opposition to the death pen-
alty. One venireman, who had been an employee of the state corrections
system, shared the lingering doubt expressed by Black respondents in the
Capital Jury Project, stating that he felt that some of the convicts he
worked with "may be innocent.' 3' He went on to say that African
Americans "disproportionately" receive the death penalty, and that then-
Governor George W Bush should have given Gary Graham, a Black man
convicted of capital murder whose execution was strongly opposed by
many Black and White citizens, a stay of execution.1 36 This venireman was
the only one to mention a previous case in explaining his opposition to
the death penalty, but was not the only one to mention racial discrimina-
tion in capital sentencing as a reason for his hesitation in meting out this
form of punishment.
In several cases, the potential jurors based their opposition to the
death penalty on religious beliefs. In Jasper v. Texas, a venireperson re-
execution of the mentally retarded. Cindy Horswell, Conmutation for Priest's Killer; A 2-
Decade-Old Sentence Changes After a Court Finds He is Retarded and Can't Be Executed,
Hous. CHRON., Mar. 17, 2005, at B1.
134. As this discussion progresses, I want to emphasize that, in analyzing the perfor-
mative nature of these hearings, it is important to acknowledge that the communicative
role of the hearings does not require accuracy, but only the repetition of the narratives
that support the agenda of the performer-in this instance, the state.
135. Simpson v. Texas, 119 S.W.3d 262, 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
136. The Graham case was an extremely controversial case that arose in Houston,
Texas. Gary Graham became a national symbol of many of the failures of the Texas death
penalty regime. See, e.g., Amy Dorsett & Kate Hunger, Capital Questions: As Execution
Date Nears, Proof of Houston Man's Guilt in Slaying Hinges on a Single Witness, SAN ANTO-
NIO EXPRESS-NEWS, June 11, 2000, at AlA; Guillermo Garcia, Texas Inmate Struggles to the
End: Courts Deny Last Minute Civil Lawsuit, USA TODAY, June 23, 2000, at 3A; Andrea
Greene, Catholic Group Backs New Trial for Inmate, Hous. CHRON., May 31, 1993, at A34.
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sponded he could not "play the role of God" and "send nobody [sic], you
know, to death.' '0 37 Margaret Sanders responded, "God says vengeance is
mine." Additionally, three venirepersons in Trevino responded that they
objected to the death penalty for religious reasons. 138 One quoted the Ten
Commandments' prohibition on killing to explain her opinion.9 Due to
high levels of religiosity among African Americans, political views are of-
ten expressed in religious language and attributed to religious beliefs.
4 0
In Casarez v. Texas, the Court distinguished racially motivated re-
moval from removal due to inability to perform juror duties because of
religious beliefs. 4' In Casarez, two Black members of the venire were re-
moved because they were Pentecostals. 4 2 The defendant made a Batson
objection, and in the hearing, the prosecutor testified that it was their re-
ligion, not their race, that motivated the challenges. 143 The bulk of the
CCA opinion analyzes whether Batson, in addition to barring race as a
basis for peremptory challenges, also bars removal for religious views. 
44
The CCA held that religion was not a pretext for race. 14' The court ex-
plains its ruling with the following:
Because all kinds of political, moral, and religious tenets are
commonly shared by people of many different races and by
those of both sexes, race and sex clearly do not reveal much of
anything about a prospective juror's beliefs. In short, discrimi-
nation against race and sex in American history was never
based upon the proposition, rational or otherwise, that women
and racial minorities subscribe to a disagreeable or undesirable
•146
belief system.
Public opinion shows that race and religion are, in fact, highly correlative.
This rationale is one way in which the law could be informed by the
study of public opinion, particularly African American public opinion.
Public opinion research also demonstrates that similar religious beliefs can
lead to completely opposite policy preferences among respondents of
137. Jasper v. Texas, 61 S.W.3d 413, 422 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
138. Trevino v. Texas, 864 S.W.2d 499, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
139. Id. at 501.
140. For an exploration of the influence of religion on African American culture and
political expression, see generally, e.g., CHARLES HENRY, CULTURE AND AFRICAN AMERI-
CAN POLITICS (1990).
141. Casarez v. Texas, 913 S.W.2d 468, 498-99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
142. Id. at 470;
143. Casarez, 913 S.W2d at 470.
144. Id. at 470-80.
145. Id. at 471-72.
146. Casarez, 913 S.W.2d at 495.
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different racial backgrounds. 47 One example of this is the death penalty.
Research shows that Blacks identifying as evangelical are more likely to
oppose the death penalty than White evangelicals, who are more likely to
support it.' 48 This research shows that the links between race and
religion-as well as other aspects of identity-are highly correlated.4 9 As
Casarez shows, the procedures created in Batson do not adequately disen-
tangle this historical and experiential mix. Thus, removal for religious
beliefs can be a proxy for racially motivated removal.
In other cases, the prosecutors used peremptory challenges to re-
move venirepersons who expressed general opposition to the death
penalty due to a variety of concerns. In one case, the venireperson did not
believe that he could be convinced that a person convicted of capital
murder would commit future acts of dangerousness."50 This response is
important because the Texas statute requires the jury to determine
whether the defendant poses a future danger. 5 ' The juror in that case felt
that he could not know the answer to this question.' Jessie Mae Mat-
thews and Helen Linued, venirewomen in Cook v. Texas, did not support
the death penalty for a person who was involved in a gun crime, but who
did not pull the trigger ("non-triggerman accomplice"). 53 These venire-
women expressed opinions ranging from reservations concerning the
death penalty to opposition to death as method of punishment."54 In an-
other case, one woman stated "during group voir dire that she would
falsify her answers to the special issues to avoid a death sentence."'
15
In addition, prosecutors used peremptory challenges to remove Afri-
can Americans who supported the death penalty.Venireman Dreannan, in
Morris v. Texas, responded that he was "strongly in favor of the death pen-
alty," but he also expressed some uncertainty about particular
characteristics of the defendant.Is6 Dreannan said he was not sure he could
147. See generally Robert L. Young, Race, Conceptions of Crime and Justice, and Support
for the Death Penalty, 54 Soc. PsYcHOL. Q. 67 (1991) (analyzing the role of religion in
shaping the attitudes of Blacks and Whites toward the death penalty and finding that hav-
ing had a born-again experience was the only of his five religious variables that impacted
death penalty support).
148. See Young, supra note 142, at 82-84.
149. See id.
150. Trevino, 864 S.W.2d at 501.
151. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071, § 2(a)(2)-(b)(1).
152. Trevino, 864 S.W.2d at 501.
153. Cook v. Texas, 858 S.W.2d 467, 472 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
154. See id. See also Tennard v. Texas, 802 S.W.2d 678, 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)
(describing juror Evelyn Guillory's reservations and ambivalence about the death penalty
and juror JoAnn Smith's response indicating that she opposed the death penalty and could
not vote to impose it and noting her later statement that she could follow the law despite
her opposition).
155. Chambers, 866 S.W.2d at 25.
156. Morris v. Texas, 940 S.W.2d 610, 612 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
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give the death penalty to someone the defendant's age because he had an
eighteen-year-old son." 7 Charles Brooks, in Camacho v. Texas, supported
the death penalty, but felt the prosecutor was too eager.1s8 Another dis-
missed venireperson in the same case responded, "Although I do not
personally believe in the death penalty, as long as the law provides for it, I
could assess it under the proper set of facts and circumstances."' 59 Both the
views of Dreannan and Brooks are within the spectrum of attitudes the
Court allows in jurors to be seated.1 60 However, in these cases Blacks were
removed whether they opposed or supported the death penalty.
Another significant group of African American jurors are those who
had an ambivalent relationship with the State. This ambivalence expressed
itself in several ways-some had uneasy feelings about law enforcement or
the criminal justice system and others knew friends and relatives who had
negative experiences with the state. For example, Venireman Vines, in
Johnson v. Texas, resented cops, who she felt abused their uniforms.61 She
also felt that police harassed her twenty-one-year-old nephew because of
his race.1 62 However, on further questioning, she admitted she was grateful
to the police for putting their lives on the line to protect the public.1
6 3
Margaret Sanders, in addition to her religious objections to the death
penalty, also responded that she did not like cops. 64 She also told the
prosecutor during questioning, "[S]he did not discuss politics, religion or
anything to do with the law.''
16
The largest subgroup of venirepersons with an ambivalent relation-
ship with the State consists of those venirepersons whom the prosecutor
challenged because of their personal connections, through friends and
relatives, with the criminal justice system. The most extreme example is
that of Leo Sterling, a venireman in DeBlanc.166 Mr. Sterling's son had been
previously tried for capital murder in the same court.17 The level of
offenses-committed by the jurors themselves or by friends and relatives-
varied from driving with a suspended license to transporting whiskey in a
dry county to a felony with a multiple decade sentence. Typically the
venireperson had a brother, nephew or some other male relative who was
157. Id.
158. Carnacho v. Texas, 864 S.W.2d 524, 529-31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
159. See id. at 529.
160. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424-26 (1985).
161. Johnson v. Texas, 68 S.W.3d 644, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Trevino, 864 S.W.2d at 500.
165. Id.
166. DeBlanc, 799 S.W.2d at 712.
167. Id.
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incarcerated or awaiting trial. 168 For example, Veniremen Earl in Simpson v.
Texas and Vines in Johnson v. Texas both had nephews who were incarcer-
ated in Texas.
169
A link to the criminal justice system ranks second only to ambiva-
lent views on the death penalty as the most frequently cited reason for
using peremptory challenges to remove African American jurors. As levels
of incarceration continue to increase among African Americans, incarcera-
tion rates are not only a factor in abridging the rights of African
American felons, but also other African Americans who are connected
through filial and social networks. There may be legitimate-or strate-
gic-legal reasons for removing those tangentially connected to the
criminal justice system, but these reasons do not negate the consequences
on African American citizenship rights and verdicts in cases involving mi-
nority defendants. Moreover, the exclusion of African Americans with
connections to the criminal justice system also reinforces perceptions of
common fate and in turn, increased identification with criminal defen-
dants among African Americans.
B. "More Intuitive Than Rational, So Long As It Is Race Neutral": Prosecutors'
Interpretations of African American Response in Batson Hearings
In Sauls v. Texas, the prosecution removed four African Americans
for cause and one with a peremptory challenge.17 0 When the prosecutor
used his peremptory challenge to remove James Bell, the remaining Afri-
can American from the jury, the defense counsel raised a Batson
objection. 17' The prosecutor gave the following reasons for removing Bell:
1) He was the only man in the pool wearing an earring;
2) He was the only man wearing more than one ring that
was not a wedding ring; and
168. It is not uncommon in small communities for the jury panel to know-or at
least be aware of-the defendant or the prosecutor. Jurors Mosley and Kennedy, in
Chambers, had incarcerated relatives who had been prosecuted by the prosecutor in the
case. Chambers, 866 S.W.2d at 24-25. Juror Kennedy was related to a woman whose
family rioted at the courthouse and the prosecutor claimed the family continued to hold a
"vocal" grudge. Id. Similarly, in another case, defense counsel's father employed one of
the African American jurors. Staley v. Texas, 887 S.W.2d 885, 898 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App.
1994).
169. Simpson, 119 S.W.3d at 267;Johnson, 68 S.W.3d at 649.
170. Sauls v. Texas, Nos. 05-00-00538-CR, 05-00-00539-CR, 05-00-00638-CR,
2001 WL 406582, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2001).
171. Id.
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3) He had on a gold medallion surrounded by at least
twelve diamonds, which the prosecutor claimed was "an
outward manifestation of his liberal tendencies."
17 2
Defense counsel argued that dismissing Bell for wearing jewelry was rac-
ist.113 According to the defense, young African American men have a
propensity to wear "bling". 4 Furthermore, he argued that "wearing a lot
of jewelry is not I think a valid reason to strike someone. But I do know
that wearing earrings and gold chains is something that a lot of young
African American men do., 175 Although the CCA found no evidence for
the defense's theory, this case raises an interesting question of how prose-
cutors' perceptions of African American members of the venire affect the
use of peremptory challenges.' 76 Appearance plays a pivotal role in how
the prosecutors in these cases construct a race neutral scheme for remov-
ing Black jurors. 177
What does a death-qualified, African American juror look like to
Texas prosecutors? In Fuentes v. Texas, the CCA upheld the removal of five
African Americans through peremptory challenges, accepting the prosecu-
tor's explanation that the jurors did not appear "particularly state-oriented"
as a race neutral reason." 8 Fuentes demonstrates the way legitimate concern
over "the fairness of the justice system" positions African Americans for
discretionary removal. 1 9 Again, it is not only the bodies of Black people,
but their collective experience of the criminal justice system and its biases
that is turned away from capital juries. In Chamberlain, the prosecutor
gives "her instincts" as the reason a Black man would not make a good
juror.8 0 The CCA approved of this reason, saying that peremptory chal-
lenges may be more intuitive than rational, so long as they are race
neutral.'" The CCA, however, failed to consider the possible connection
between the beliefs of legal counsel and racial norms and realities that
underlie subjective views of race neutrality.s2Where the example in Sauls
172. Id.
173. Id. at *2.
174. The word "bling" was chosen because it alludes to a particular kind of aesthetic
originally associated with young Black men. This is my word choice, not the court's. The
word "bling" is hip hop slang for expensive jewelry and other flashy accoutrement.
175. Sauls, 2001 WL 406582, at *2.
176. Id. at *4.
177. Other research has shown the role of nonverbal cues in the jury selection proc-
ess. See, e.g., Jim Goodwin, Articulating the Inarticulable: Relying on Nonverbal Behavioral
Cues to Deception to Strike Jurors During Voir Dire, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 739 (1996).
178. Fuentes v. Texas, 991 S.W.2d 267, 278-79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
179. Id. at 278 n.5 (summarizing a statement by an African American juror in the
case).
180. Chamberlain v. Texas, 998 S.W.2d 230, 236 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
181. Id.
182. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 104-10 (Marshall J., concurring) (suggesting that intui-
tive beliefs mask racial prejudices).
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focused on superficial appearances, the issue of how prosecutors perceive
Black jurors beyond their fashion choices is also important in understand-
ing how prosecutors utilize peremptory challenges. Another common
justification for removal using peremptory strikes is the prosecutor's per-
ception of the venireperson's social and intellectual abilities. In Jasper v.
Texas, the prosecutor testified, "he noticed mannerisms demonstrating
uncertainty with some answers," but did not offer any explanation of
what those mannerisms were or why they rendered the venireperson un-
fit.8 According to the prosecutor in Staley v. Texas, Venireperson Calvert
was nervous."184 She was unable to "follow the law" and, "although
Calvert was employed in a restaurant, she expressed no feeling about a
capital murder committed in a restaurant. 1 8 1 She was "hesitant," "weak
willed," and "unable to maintain any opinion in the face of the question-
ing or challenge."8 6 The prosecutor in Chambers v. Texas also had a litany
of factors that made Venirewoman Cox a bad juror.187 She was young, un-
employed, and had a brother with mental problems, which, by the
prosecutor's estimations, made her more sympathetic to the defendant.'88
Also in Chambers, the prosecutor "believed [Venirewoman Brown] was
intimidated during the individual voir dire and would not then admit the
true extent of her opposition to the death penalty.' 89 Henry Nichols, ac-
cording to the prosecutor in Tennard v. Texas, had "trouble understanding
questions" and was of "limited intelligence."'90 Another venireman in that
case was also of "low intelligence," according to the prosecutor, "such that
he simply agreed with whoever was questioning him at the moment."'9'1
The most frequent reason offered by prosecutors in the cases ana-
lyzed is that the veniremen vacillated on the death penalty. A
venirewoman in Chambers stated, "I don't think I could vote for the death
183. Jasper, 61 S.W.3d at 422.
184. Staley, 887 S.W.2d at 898 n.3 (Clifton, J., concurring).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Chambers, 866 S.W.2d at 24.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 26.
190. Tennard, 802 S.W.2d at 681. Note the similarities of the prosecutor's assessment
of this Black juror's intelligence to the question the Supreme Court grappled with in Neal
v. Delaware in 1880. 103 U.S. at 390. Though it is clear that race relations have progressed
significantly since the latter part of the 19th century, it is not clear that we have reached a
point where we can say with certainty race does not impact perceptions of one's intelli-
gence. Fukurai and his coauthors suggest that the view expressed in 1880 continues
through the next 100 years in litigation on race and jury participation. FUKURAI ET AL.,
supra note 12, at 81. The history of these cases "reveal[s] an implicit view of blacks as
inferior, reaffirmed by the limitations imposed, or the tokenism used, to influence the
jury selection process involving black jurors." Id. at 81-82.
191. Tennard, 802 S.W.2d at 681.
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penalty," but later admitted that she could follow the law.'92 In the same
case, another Black woman was also said to have "vacillated" about the
death penalty. 93 According to the prosecutor in DeBlanc, a venirewoman
changed her views depending on whether questioned by prosecution or
defense. 94 Joann Smith, in the view of the prosecutor in Tennard, "initially
indicated that she was opposed to the death penalty and could not vote so
as to impose the death penalty," but later she stated that she could follow
the law despite her views.'95 In some cases, the jurors vacillated on the
level of proof the state would have to mount.196 For instance, Leo Sterling
in DeBlanc did not believe in circumstantial evidence. In the same case,
Venireman Johnson, according to the prosecutor, required a higher level
of proof.9 7 Using a peremptory challenge when a venireperson vacillates
on the death penalty is problematic because of the Supreme Court's ar-
ticulation of the rule that people unresolved or uncertain about the death
penalty should be included on capital juries, if they can follow the law. 98 ,
The implications of African Americans' familiarity with the criminal
justice system discussed above are pronounced in analysis of the prosecu-
tors' explanation for removal. In Herron v. Texas, the Court of Appeals
upheld a juror strike against a Black venirewoman for both familiarity
with "defendants" and vacillating on the death penalty. The prosecutor
"discovered through an out-of-court investigation" the basis for its strike
and testified that this investigation revealed,
[She] had a reputation at her workplace for being stubborn
and close-minded ... she had confrontations with her supervi-
sors and co-workers. An investigator with the sheriff's office
who knew [the venirewoman] advised the State that she "had a
chip on her shoulder," that she would likely let race influence
her verdict, and that she was not someone they wanted on the
jury. The prosecutor also informed the judge that the father of
[venirewoman's] children had an extensive criminal record. In
fact, [the venirewoman] had been investigated for assaulting
that man. Finally, the prosecutor explained that [the venire-
woman] apparently had numerous domestic relations problems
which indicated a level of instability in her life.' 99
192. Chambers, 866 S.W.2d at 25.
193. Id. at 24.
194. DeBlanc, 799 S.W.2d at 712.
195. Tennard, 802 S.W.2d at 681.
196. Good examples of this are Tommy Crosby in Keeton v. Texas, 749 S.W.2d 861,
864 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), and James Doyle and Henry Nichols in Tennard, 802 S.W.2d
at 681.
197. DeBlanc, 799 S.W.2d at 712.
198. See generally Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 445-47.
199. Herron v. Texas, 86 S.W.3d 621, 631 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
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Based on the subjective view of someone outside of the litigation process,
the CCA willingly accepted that this venirewoman was hostile, biased and
potentially incompetent. Despite the prosecution's failure to demonstrate
that the venirewoman was unfit in voir dire, the court upheld this strike as
race neutral .
In some cases, jurors indicated that they did not want to serve on
the jury because they knew the defendant. In DeBlanc, several of the ju-
rors knew the defendant or his family intimately.20 1 One venireperson in
DeBlanc also knew the accomplice witness whom the prosecutor planned
to put on the stand at trial.2 °2 The prosecutor challenged the juror because
he "felt that anybody who knew [the accomplice] too well would have
trouble believing his testimony.' '201 In McGee v. Texas, Blacks in the com-
munity did not want to sit on the jury due to their "familiarity" with the
defendant.0 4 Defense counsel asked one of the Black jurors, "[I]f all the
Black people in the community asked to be excused, do you think
[McGee] would get a fair trial?, 20 5 The venireman replied:
No, sir, I don't, but only if they didn't know him. If they don't
know the people that is involved in it ... maybe they could do
it. But, I mean you know, I been here nearly twenty-six years
and I went to the laundromat [with the victim] .... And I have
seen this man walk around and I just can't do it ... This is too
much on me,Your Honor. It is making me sick. 6
Though this may appear at first reading to rebut the argument that prose-
cutors remove African American jurors due to race but rather remove
jurors whose close proximity to crime and victims make them less willing
to participate, I would disagree. Since Strauder, the Supreme Court has
made clear that jury participation, when called and if chosen, is an obliga-
tion of citizenship. Allowing Blacks to remove themselves from that
obligation because of the difficulty of the task runs counter to the clear
principle first articulated in Strauder and reaffirmed in later cases. In Snyder
v. Louisiana, a 2008 case involving race and peremptory challenges, the
Supreme Court paid specific attention to prosecutor's use of a peremptory
challenge to remove an African American juror who expressed concern
that service would interfere with another obligation. 20 7 The Court made
200. Id.
201. DeBlanc, 799 S.W.2d at 712.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. McGee v. Texas, 774 S.W.2d 229, 245 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
205. Id. at 246.
206. Id.
207. Snyder, 552 U.S. at 475-482. In Snyder, the prosecution used a peremptory
challenge to remove juror Jeffrey Brooks. Id. at 475-76. Defense counsel raised a Batson
objection. Id. at 476. The prosecutors argued that Brooks appeared to be nervous because
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clear that even reasons jurors offer themselves to be excused from partici-
pation are subject to the comparative review called for in Miller-El.28
Snyder stands for the principle that the difficulties imposed by jury service
do not constitute a race neutral reason for a peremptory strike unless all
jurors, regardless of race, are struck for similar reasons. Indeed, several of
the cases where Black jurors knew the defendant were tried in small
communities where it is likely other non-Black members of the commu-
nity were also familiar with the defendants or the victims.
As we move into the realm of the symbolic and speculative, as much
of our understanding of juries and jury service does, the question of
whether removing of Black jurors who have contact-intimate or cas-
ual-with defendants constitutes a race-neutral reason is an important
one. In previous work, I discussed the way in which, not only death row
inmates, but Black men generally entangled in the criminal justice system
are characterized as kind of Black "Everymen," making their stories gen-
erally familiar to many in the Black community.210 If one adds negative
interactions with the state through law enforcement-from racially moti-
vated traffic stops to more serious interactions like the imposition of the
death penalty-the resonance of such cases orients African Americans to a
particular understanding of their relationship to the state. The removal of
African Americans for either familiarity with the criminal justice system
or hostility to the state and its agents is, most arguably, not race neutral.
V DECONSTRUCTING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE BATSON RITUAL
With the above cases in focus, the utility of peremptory challenges
brings us back to the debate started by Justices Marshall and Rehnquist in
the cases leading up to and including Batson. How does one ferret out
impermissible racial motivations and maintain this tool so long a part of
the adversarial system? Are judges, at any level, equipped with the inter-
rogatory skill, information, or authority to evaluate the race neutrality of
the reasons offered by prosecutors in any case and particularly in capital
cases where the racial divide in public opinion is so sharp and well
he feared sequestration, which would take him away from his student teaching obliga-
tions. Id. Brooks's concern for his schooling, in the prosecutor's view, made him more
inclined to find for one of the lesser-included offenses, which would take less time to
adjudicate. Id. The Court found this reason failed the race-neutrality requirement because
the prosecutor accepted White jurors who expressed concerns about other obligations
more substantial Brooks's. Id. at 481.
208. Id. at 476 ("In Miller-El v. Dretke, the Court made it clear that in considering a
Batson objection, or in reviewing a ruling claimed to be Batson error, all of the circum-
stances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity must be consulted.").
209. Id. at 182-86 (comparing the varying levels of consideration the prosecutor
gave to conflicts cited by specific Black and White jurors).
210. See, e.g., Price, supra note 30.
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measured? These cases demonstrate, I argue, that courts are unable-or
unwilling-to intrude to the degree necessary to determine when race is
a factor in the use of peremptory challenges. Even if willing, what is con-
sidered by the courts to be race neutral is so overbroad and formalistic
that it makes the words of the prosecutors an impenetrable veil of dis-
crimination and renders the court ineffective in its stated goal of curing
such discrimination within the trial itself. When the words exchanged
between the prosecutor and the members of the venire are not helpful in
ascertaining meaning, one must look further at other exchanges and ac-
tions, as the court did in Miller-El and Snyder, to decipher the
performance that plays out in these hearings.
Since Strauder, it is unconstitutional to remove African Americans
from juries solely because of race. However, Batson hearings and other
measures aimed at ensuring juries are selected without racial discrimina-
tion laid bare the reality that these efforts have not been successful. The
Batson hearing can be categorized as ritual because it has become almost
mechanical 21' not only in its performance, but also in the court's review of
the performance. There is a decipherable pattern to the responses offered
by African Americans and prosecutors. Social science research has for dec-
ades demonstrated two aspects of African American public opinion
important to this research. First, African Americans do not believe that
they receive equal treatment under the law. Second, African Americans'
belief that they are not treated equally leads to skepticism and to distrust
the state's exercise of power,212 particularly the exercise of that power
through criminal justice polices like the death penalty. There is strong evi-
dence to legitimate this continued skepticism. Prosecutors' unwillingness
to accept African American jurors translates to an unwillingness to accept
the perspectives African Americans bring to bear in the adjudication of
capital cases.2 13
Underlying every ritual is meaning-symbolic gestures to the in-
strumental purpose of the ritual. The meaning of symbolic gestures,
according to Wuthnow, depends on "its relationship to a set of objective
truths, the sincerity of the speakers involved, the degree to which com-
prehensible language is used and its legitimacy to social norms and
circumstances. 2t 4 Batson hearings are a symbolic gesture towards sanitizing
the jury selection process of discriminatory ills such as racism. They are
symbolic because they have done very little to prevent the systematic re-
211. WUTHNOW, supra note 89 (defining ritualization of behavior).
212. See MICHAEL C. DAWSON, BLACK VISIONS: THE ROOTS OF CONTEMPORARY
AFRICAN AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES 310 (2001).
213. CJP findings show that African Americans are more likely to "cast a vote for
life" and that their influence is minimized at times by their small numbers. Theodore
Eisenberg et al., Forecasting Life and Death: Juror Race, Religion, and Attitude Toward the
Death Penalty, 30J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 279 (2001).
214. WUTHNOW, supra note 89, at 140.
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moval of Blacks by peremptory challenges from capital juries. Batson hear-
ings have, however, become a visible presence in capital trials that allow
the state to dissimulate continued discriminatory practices. Consequently,
the objective truth of the jury selection process is that there is a dearth of
African Americans on capital juries. The absence of Blacks from juries
does not necessarily equal racist decision making, but systematic removal
of Black jurors based on the same patterns-particularly those correlated
with race, like incarceration-raises suspicion that Blacks are, or at least
are perceived to be, an obstacle to the state's goal of successfully imposing
a death sentence. The failure to find such tangible and direct evidence as
the manual employed by the Dallas County Prosecutors Office does not
mean that such practices do not continue to be a part of the unwritten
culture of such offices.
If we accept that the integrity of the criminal justice system requires
the setting of some minimal requirements for participation, then the fur-
ther disparate treatment of African Americans in the use of discretionary
tools like peremptory challenges pushes those acts beyond simple institu-
tional racism. 2 5 In Wainwright v. Witt, the Court held that prospective
jurors should only be excluded for cause when their views of the death
penalty render them incapable of upholding the oath to follow the judge's
• • 216
instructions. Following the Court's logic in Wainwright, the oath of
members of the venire to be truthful about their ability to decide be-
tween innocence and guilt and life and death should be sufficient to make
the race of the juror and the defendant irrelevant. If the oath is as power-
ful as the Court suggests, why then continue to use such a problematic
legal instrument as the peremptory challenge? Justice Marshall's sugges-
tion that we abandon peremptory challenges altogether appears to be the
best course of action if the parties are truly interested in removing race
and racism as factors in discretionary challenges.2 7 Additionally, one can
push the Court's logic further by acknowledging that prosecutors-as
state agents and members of the bar-have multiple codes of conduct that
215. Institutional racism is a term theorized by Carmichael and Hamilton in their
canonical civil rights text. STOKELY CARMICHAEL & CHARLES V. HAMILTON, BLACK
POWER: THE POLITICS OF LIBERATION IN AMERICA (1967). They define institutional racism
as discrimination that "relies on the active and pervasive operation of anti-black attitudes
and practices." Id. at 5.
216. Wainnght, 469 U.S. at 420 (citing Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 44 (1980))
(noting that the proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be ex-
cluded for cause because of his views on capital punishment is whether the juror's views
would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accor-
dance with his instructions and his oath").
217. Batson, 476 U.S. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., concurring). Since Marshall's call for
the elimination of peremptory challenges, several other justices have made similar argu-
ments or raised serious questions about whether the current line of decisions will allow
for the maintenance of the practice. See, e.g., Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 267 (Breyer, J., con-
curring); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 60 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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regulate their behavior and require them to make sincere efforts to up-
hold the law.218 Allowing prosecutors, and defense attorneys, for that
matter, to disguise racially biased jury selections in a race neutral perform-
ance undermines not just the oaths of jurors, but those charged with
ensuring the fairness of the process.2'9 Ultimately, it places the process it-
self into question.
A residual issue when evaluating ritual is whether common lan-
guage equals common meaning. In each presentation of a performance,
the same words and movements are repeated. There may be changes in
tone and inflection, but essentially the performances are the same. But, it
is not clear that each of the spectators hears and interprets them the same
way. The question of different meaning despite common language is sig-
nificant because a generous reading of the prosecutors' reasons could be
that prosecutors use their discretion solely to remove jurors who have
connections and opinions unfavorable to their case. This reading makes
correlations to race incidental. It is possible that when African American
jurors speak, prosecutors hear and see only hostility to the state and its
position.
Yet in a pervasively racialized society, it is always possible that the
meanings of words differ when filtered through the lens of race. Do you
believe in the death penalty? Yes or no? Do you believe in the death pen-
alty for a non-triggerman accomplice? Yes or no? The monosyllabic
response solicited by the question does not make meaning simple, but if
we look to the prospective jurors' patterns of response, meaning becomes
clearer. So for instance, the simple reading of hostility on the part of Afri-
can Americans could mask a more complicated relationship with the state
as both persecutor and protector of Black communities concerned with
escalating violence in their neighborhoods-feelings, it should be noted,
that could potentially work against defendants in the adjudication of
criminal trials. The possibility of inter-racial misinterpretation, particularly
in the gray area of discretionary challenges, only adds to the constitutional
concerns raised by discriminatory uses of peremptory challenges and the
case against the continuation of their use.
Another aspect of ritual significant to Batson is that rituals gain le-
gitimacy in relation to social norms and circumstances. This is where a
ritualistic understanding of Batson hearings is most informative. The death
penalty is an area of law where the Court has paid tremendous attention
to "community" consensus, but it has not deconstructed the meaning of
218. A good example of a prosecutorial obligation is the requirement that it must
notify defense counsel of possibly exculpatory evidence, even if it is detrimental to the
state's case. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963).
219. Prosecutors and defense attorneys are what Amar calls "repeat-player regulars."
Amar, supra note 17, at 1178. The regularity of the presence of these figures allows for
greater opportunities "to manipulate demographics and chisel an unrepresentative panel
out of a cross-sectional venire." Id. at 1182.
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community in any way. For the last three decades, watershed capital cases
have referenced polls that show the majority of Americans support the
death penalty.2 0 Truly, the only place where color-blind community exists
is in the fictive community constructed in the Court's death penalty deci-
sions.2 2 ' The death penalty is legal in thirty-eight states and at the federal
level. However, a poll by the Pew Research Center found that forty per-
cent of Blacks favored the death penalty compared to sixty-eight percent
of'hites.222
Despite significant differences of support among Black and White
Americans, the Court continues to speak of community consensus as if
the views and the "community" were monolithic.2 In fact, the Court's
view of an inclusive community obscures the history of the death penalty
itself, which was used as a tool to control the behavior of groups who,
due to race or other prejudices, were deemed outside of the protected
"community.'--2 One can point to the high incarceration rates and the
disproportionate use of the death penalty against Black and Brown people
today to suggest that these legal proceedings take place in a context where
race is a factor. One of the conundrums of the criminal justice system,
and the reason I use the word ambivalence instead of opposition when
characterizing African American public opinion on the death penalty, is
that African Americans, especially those in lower socio-economic strata,
bear the brunt of under-policing and state crime policy while longing for
better, safer communities.22 5 Batson rituals say that even African Americans
220. A good example of this reliance appears in Atkins v. Virginia, when the Court
points to polls conducted by news organizations and religious groups to support its view
of a community consensus against execution of the mentally retarded. Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002).
221. Indeed, recent work on contemporary manifestations of racism argues that
Whites' claims of color-blind views of race are a "justification" for continued racial ine-
quality. EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND RACISM
AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES 208 (2d ed. 2006).
222. Robert Ruby & Allison Pond, An Enduring Majority: Americans Continue to Sup-
port the Death Penalty, THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, Dec. 19, 2007,
http://pewforum.org/docs/?DoclD=272 (last visited Oct. 31, 2009).
223. In the end, Wuthnow connects these symbolic expressions as a precursor to
ideology. WUTHNOW, supra note 89, at 152. Much work has been done in recent years on
ideology among African Americans, most notably work like Dawson's BLACK VISIONS. See
generally DAWSON, supra note 212. Dawson's work has helped to reveal the multiplicity of
views in Black public opinion. Blacks are not monolithic in terms of ideology. There are,
however, significant commonalities in policy preferences. Id. This Article takes one step
back from ideology to assess the role of race in communicating norms about the meanings
of citizenship, community, and the integration of African American policy preferences, in
addition to their bodies, in community evaluations of the death penalty.
224. See MARQUART ET AL., supra note 33, at 17.
225. The under-policing is evidenced by statistics that show murderers of Black
victims receive far less punishment than murderers of other victims. RANDALL KENNEDY,
RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 69-75 (1997).
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who meet the minimal criteria for participation suffer the taint of crimi-
nality and exclusion because of the behavior of other members of their
racial community.
Lastly, Batson hearings, similar to subsequent appellate processes and
the execution itself, have become ritualized steps performed to legitimize
the process rather than ensure that verdicts in capital cases represent a just
outcome. Understanding the Batson hearings as a performance links it to
other ways in which the current jurisprudence on the administration of
the death penalty focuses more on procedural rather than substantive jus-
tice. The view of courts as a protector of a fallible and all-too human
process has brought with it routine checks in the process that seem more
like quality control rather than real reviews of the behavior of state actors,
which often reflect unconstitutional practices. Supreme Court decisions
concerning actual innocence in capital cases are a good example of this
transition. 2 6 The Court has separated the underlying question-is the de-
fendant guilty of the crime for which he has been sentenced to death-
from the performance of the trial and the question of whether the process
was fair. One has to question the utility of such disconnections when, in
cases of actual innocence, they fail to prevent or correct wrongful convic-
tions and, in Batson violations, theyfail to prevent or correct impermissible
uses of race in jury selection. We are left with the question of what this
emphasis on form over substance means for the fairness and justice that
are purported to be the foundation of the entire process. This Article ar-
gues that the continuation of Batson rituals systemically excludes Blacks
and their views from the adjudicative process, leaving us with a process
that is less fair and just than it could be.
VI. DEATH-QUALIFICATION AS A CONVENIENT MASK OF
DISCRIMINATION IN THE BATSON RITUAL
Courts' routine acceptance of Black jurors' "vacillation" on the
death penalty as a race neutral reason for peremptory strikes requires spe-
cific discussion in this analysis. The acceptance of vacillation on the death
penalty raises questions because of the rules already in place to evaluate
which attitudes about the death penalty disqualify members of the venire
for service on capital juries.The requirement that juries be death qualified
allows prosecutors to specifically question jurors on their attitudes toward
the death penalty. Even when this requirement does not lead to removals
for cause, prosecutors use African Americans' previously expressed atti-
226. In Herrera v. Collins, the Court makes a distinction between legal and actual
innocence. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398-400 (1993) ("A person when first
charged with a crime is entitled to a presumption of innocence, and may insist that his
guilt be established beyond a reasonable doubt. .... Once a defendant has been afforded a
fair trial and convicted of the offense for which he was charged, the presumption of inno-
cence disappears.").
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tudes about the death penalty as convenient cover for their removal using
peremptory challenges. Litigation and research reveal that death-qualified
juries are biased towards death.227 This bias towards death is further dis-
torted by prosecutors' use of attitudes about the death penalty garnered
during the voir dire determination of death qualification as the basis for
peremptory. As CJP research demonstrates, the mere presence of Black
jurors can be as impactful as their perceptions in the difference between
life and death.
The Supreme Court spent more than three decades trying to dis-
cern the spectrum of attitudes acceptable for participation in a capital jury
beyond the basic qualifications for jury service. Early on, the Court con-
fronted the question posed by the vacillation exhibited by the Black
jurors by answering the question, "[Clan jurors who oppose the death
penalty be excused for cause? 2 28 When venirepersons who have "qualms"
about the death penalty are removed from capital juries, Justice Stewart
posited the jury that remains no longer represents a cross-section of
community views.29 Consequently, simply expressing reservations about
the death penalty did not in and of itself constitute cause for removal.230
This early view of "the community" as the ultimate decision maker in
capital cases foretells the Court's increased reliance on some idea of a
231
'community consensus" in more recent decisions.
227. Hovey, 616 P.2d at 1314-41. In Hovey, the defendant argued that jurors who
would automatically oppose the death penalty in the penalty phase could not be constitu-
tionally excused for cause from sitting in the guilt/innocence phase if they could be
impartial. Id. at 1301. This forwarded a substantial amount of survey data on deliberations
in death penalty cases, including studies on remorse over wrongful convictions, gender
and racial disparities, and attitudes toward counsel. Id. at 1314-41.
228. In Witherspoon's trial, the prosecutor removed half the venire using this statute
because they expressed "qualms about capital punishment." Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510, 513 (1968) (using 38 III. Rev. Stat. 5 743 (1959)). The defendant in
Witherspoon claimed that the exclusion of jurors with "qualms" about the death penalty
resulted in a jury that favored the prosecution and was more likely to find guilt. Id. at
516.
229. Id. at 519-520 ("A man who opposes the death penalty, no less than one who
favors it, can make the discretionary judgment entrusted to him by the State and can thus
obey the oath he takes as a juror. But a jury from which all such men have been excluded
cannot perform the task demanded of it.... Yet, in a nation less than half of whose peo-
ple believe in the death penalty, a jury composed exclusively of such people cannot speak
for the community.").
230. Id. at 522 n.21 ("The most that can be demanded of a venireman in this regard
is that he be willing to consider all of the penalties provided by state law, and that he not
be irrevocably committed, before the trial has begun, to vote against the penalty of death
regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course of the proceed-
ings.").
231. For example, in Witherspoon, the Court established two essential questions for
juries in capital cases: 1) would the juror automatically vote against the death penalty
without looking at the evidence; or 2) would the juror's views on the death penalty pre-
vent him or her from fairly deciding the defendant's guilt. Id. at 522 n.21. This test
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The question taken up in Wainwright v. Witt is more closely akin to
the views expressed by Black venirepersons and the prosecutorial re-
sponses in the cases at issue here. In Wainwright, the Court addressed the
propriety of removing a juror who testified that she had reservations
about the death penalty, but would not automatically oppose the death
'3,penalty.:3 The Supreme Court addresses the appropriate action when a
juror's views on the death penalty would "prevent or substantially impair
the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instruc-
tions and his oath.'' 233 The Court was concerned that the language in
Witherspoon had been taken too literally. 234 The real issue, in the Wainwright
court's view, was whether jurors could do the job. Justice Rehnquist, writ-
ing for the majority, argued there was a strong state interest in making
sure that the jurors who are finally seated can do what the law requires.23
Jurors must be able to follow the judges' instructions and obey the oath of
236
service. What survives in the practice of capital jury selection after
Wainwright is a single question: Can the juror follow the law?237 All jurors
have to be "death-qualified"--meaning they could give the death penalty
if the crime in the immediate cases met the legal requirement for the as-
sessment of the punishment-which significantly narrows the spectrum of
attitudes of those seated on capital juries.
A year later, the Court was confronted with another capital jury
question.2 38 Are "death-qualified" juries biased in favor of death during
the sentencing phase of capital trials?239 The Court dismissed empirical
evidence that supported the appellant's argument because the studies did
not take into account the oath jurors are required to take.24 ° In the Court's
view, the jurors' words bound them to follow the letter of the law, no
essentially allowed all attitudes about the death penalty on the jury with the exception of
those on either extreme-complete opposition in all situations or a vote for death in spite
of evidence to the contrary. Witherspoon advocates an expansive understanding of the
community of ideas that can participate in the adjudication of capital cases-an under-
standing that sentencing a defendant to death, like all punishment, should be at the
discretion of a jury that reflects the attitudes and values of the community.
232. Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 415. The juror was asked if she had "any religious be-
liefs ... against the death penalty." Id. She responded that her opposition to the death
penalty was "a little personal, but definitely not religious." Id. at 415-16. The prosecutor
then asked if her feelings would interfere with determining the defendant's guilt or inno-
cence, to which the juror responded that she felt it would. Id. at 416.
233. Id. at 424.
234. See id. at 424-26.
235. Id. at 421.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 419.
238. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
239. Id. at 168.
240. Id. at 171,192.
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matter their personal ethics.241' This conclusion on the significance of
swearing an oath is quite relevant as we move forward. The frequent ac-
ceptance of a prosecutor's justification that Blacks were ambivalent about
the death penalty in the cases in this sample suggests that Texas prosecu-
tors and courts do not hold to the Supreme Court's belief in the power of
a juror's word. Alternatively, we must accept the opposite assertion mir-
rored in this logic: That Black jurors-who could not be removed for
cause on the same grounds-can be peremptorily challenged for their
views on the death penalty because the state questions their ability to ful-
fill their oath. 42
Death qualification requires jurors to articulate a clear position on
•243
punishment. In an effort to balance the state's other interests-
impartiality, due process, and prohibiting discrimination based on immu-
table characteristics-the Supreme Court has been clear about the need
to scrutinize jurors' personal and policy views in death penalty cases. This
increased scrutiny has resulted, in practice, in further shrinking the jury
pool in a way that arguably has important racial implications. First, the
death-qualified pool more finely filters for those opposed to the death
penalty than those who may have inappropriate levels of support, resulting
in a jury pool that is more likely to find defendants guilty.4 Another con-
sequence of these decisions, arguably, is that the prohibition of a broader
spectrum of attitudes about the death penalty exacerbates the racial lop-
sidedness of the attitudes and bodies actually seated on juries. Second,
persons who oppose the death penalty are not evenly distributed
throughout the population. As a result, African Americans are more likely
241. The studies found that death-qualified jurors were "conviction-prone." Id. at
170-71.
242. In answering whether death qualified juries are biased in favor of the death
penalty, the Court also suggested that the application of the fair cross-section rule to the
death penalty was erroneous. Id. at 173-78. The fair cross-section rule, according to Jus-
tice Rehnquist, only applies to immutable characteristics (e.g., race and gender), not
attitudes toward state policies. Id. at 174-175. The state's main concern is seating a jury
that will follow the law. See id. at 174.
243. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 176. The same year as Lockhart, the Court addressed a
different aspect of capital juries that is also relevant to this project. In Turner v. Murray, the
appellant argued that in cases involving interracial crimes-crimes where the defendant
and the victim were of different races-counsel should be permitted to ask the jurors
questions about their views on race. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 31 (1986). Turner,
an African American convicted of killing a White shopkeeper, argued that his counsel
should have been able to inform venirepersons of the victim's race and ask questions on
racial attitudes during voir dire. Id. The trial judge dismissed the idea and permitted de-
fense to ask only if the jurors felt they may be biased in some way that would prohibit
them from being good jurors. Id. The Supreme Court held that the minimal intrusiveness
of telling the jury the race of the defendant and victim is overwhelmed by the importance
of minimizing the role of race, especially in death penalty cases. Id. at 37.
244. See Hovey, 61.6 P.2d at 1314-41 (discussing studies of the Witherspoon death
qualification requirement and conviction prone-ness in capital juries).
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to be disqualified from service based on attitudes toward the death pen-
alty.24 Not only are African Americans the object of prosecutor bias, but
also poor people, the less educated and certain religious groups.246
VII.ThE ARGUMENT AGAINST PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES AND ITS RITUALS
"If these general assertions were accepted as rebutting a defendant's
prima facie case, the Equal Protection Clause would be but a vain and
illusory requirement. ,247
In criminal trials, the jury is the place where individual identities
and values negotiate with the State over appropriate behavior and appro-
priate punishment. Peremptory challenges are a long tradition in
litigation, but so is racial discrimination in the use of peremptory chal-
lenges. How courts could construct rules that would minimize the role of
race in the use of peremptory challenges and maintain the practice is un-
clear. The prediction by Justices Marshall and Rehnquist of the difficulty
of these endeavors is born out in the litigation and the practices that fol-
lowed.
The repetition of Batson hearings with little vindication of the rights
of Black citizens makes a strong case for reading them as little more than
performance. Studies commonly point to the disproportionate representa-
tion of Black men on death row without acknowledging that the
presence of Black men in other parts of the processes has important ef-
fects as well. Moreover, reading these hearings as ritual demonstrates the
way administration of the death penalty and discrimination within that
administration has implications for the entire African American commu-
nity. African Americans are ambivalent about the death penalty largely
because they are ambivalent about their relationship to the state and the
state's ability to be fair and impartial in cases involving not just Black de-
fendants but most interactions between the state and African American
citizens. By thinking about the way that these other early processes com-
municate the relationship between African Americans and the state, the
implications for the larger Black community are clearer.
As the Supreme Court itself suggests in the Batson quote that is the
epigraph for this part of the Article, how do we ensure that the require-
ments of the Equal Protection Clause are neither "vain" nor "illusory?"
The best way to ensure that the equal protection concerns these chal-
lenges give rise to are not violated is to remove them altogether.
Cleansing capital trials of racial entanglements is difficult, particularly tri-
als with Black defendants. Maintaining components that do not serve the
245. See, e.g., Baldus et al., supra note 10.
246. Id. at 15.
247. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98 (citing Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 598 (1935)).
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ultimate goal of the fair deliberation of evidence and assessing punish-
ment only undermines the attempts to distinguish the current death
penalty regimes from those of the past.
In Miller-El, the Supreme Court provided specific guidance to lower
courts on analyzing voir dire transcripts and statistical evidence. Each of
the cases on peremptory challenges creates a new primer for how courts
can or should analyze these claims. More than twenty years after Batson v.
Kentucky, it seems increasingly clear that either the Supreme Court cannot
construct an adequate process for dealing with racial discrimination in
peremptory challenges or lower courts are unable to implement the
primer or both. The need to reaffirm and readdress this particular aspect
of litigation practice, particularly in capital trials, suggests that Batson hear-
ings, originally intended to be a remedial measure against discrimination,
are no remedy at all.
The very state that gave rise to Batson v. Kentucky still found it nec-
essary to single out peremptory challenges in a new study of the same
county where the case arose some twenty years later.2 48 The Kentucky
Supreme Court, as part of a larger initiative to assess racial fairness in the
state court system, convened an interdisciplinary panel of judges, lawyers
and civic leaders to report on a series of topics including the jury process.
In its recommendations" the Chief Justice Racial Fairness Commission
urged less reliance on peremptory challenges and more substantive evalua-
tions of the justifications offered by litigants: In addition to its
recommendations, the Commission also "discussed at length" the value of
peremptory challenges and, more than two decades on from Batson, were
"strongly" divided along similar lines as Justices Marshall and
Rehnquist. 2'0 The report concluded its discussion on peremptory chal-
lenges with the following: "The Commission was split with no clear
majority on recommending reduction, elimination, keeping the number
peremptory challenges allowed as they currently exist, or even increasing
248. Louisville is the largest city in the state and by significant numbers the most
diverse. U.S. Census Bureau, State and County Quick Facts: Louisville/Jefferson County
(Balance), Kentucky, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/21/2148006.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 9, 2009). Although Blacks only represent 7.5% of the statewide population, they
make up thirty-three percent of the population of Louisville. Id.
249. In the fall of 2008, the commission made the following recommendations:
1. Examine the use of peremptory challenges available to litigants, and
provide training to prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges that pro-
motes representative juries.
2. Automatically require a race-neutral justification whenever a prospec-
tive juror is stricken, or whenever a racial minority is stricken.
3. Modify the legal standard by which judges assess Batson challenges to
heighten the justification requirements for removing a juror.
CHIEF JUSTICE RACIAL FAIRNESS COMMISSION, CHIEF JUSTICE'S COMMISSION ON RACIAL
FAIRNESS IN THE COURTS REPORT ON JURY PROCESS 8 (2008) (copy on file with author).
250. Id. at 6.
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the number; however there was consensus that the topic bears further
consideration by the Kentucky Bar Association."25 '
The Kentucky Supreme Court should be lauded for its willingness
to look honestly at its own practices and the practices of those who ap-
pear before it and the initiative and its recommendations further point to
the continuing problems associated with Batson hearings. Though this
Commission did not have a clear majority, I suggest their failure to reach
consensus only further supports the argument against the use of such a
divisive and discriminatory litigation tool.
Some may react to the suggestion to do away with peremptory
challenges with shock similar to those early reactions to Paul Butler's ar-
guments in favor of jury nullification as a cure for racist policy and
decision making in other parts of the criminal justice system.5 2 What is
similar in these works is the call, when the system is significantly broken,
to ask for decisive and drastic repair. Like Butler, I am also concerned
about the way in which race has so permeated policy and legal arenas.
This Article asks where we can excise components of the criminal justice
system that are used to target members of specific communities, should it
not be done. Mostly, this Article highlights the continued concerns about
the feasibility of constructing selection practices in capital cases that will
eradicate racial discrimination in peremptory challenges. 3 The analysis
and suggestions offered in this Article are simply more evidence in sup-
port of Justice Marshall's argument that the removal of a practice with the
"inherent potential ... to distort the jury process by permitting the exclu-
sion of jurors on racial grounds" is not "too great a price to pay" in the
efforts at fairness and justice.2'54
There is a counter argument to that outlined in this Article, that
peremptory challenges also help criminal defense lawyers, who, with the
same prohibited motivations as the state, shape juries in a manner favor-
able to them and their clients. My response is a relatively simple one.
Turnabout is not fair play in violations of the Constitution. Contrary to
the argument Justice Rehnquist makes in dissent in Batson, we have not
seen the cancelling effects of discriminatory uses of peremptory chal-
lenges.25s5 Blacks continue to be disproportionately targeted for removal in
capital cases, and peremptory challenges are the main weapon in prosecu-
tors' arsenal. Because criminal defense attorneys are not representatives of
the state, the Court has focused less attention on their behavior. This inat-
tentiveness does not, however, allow criminal defense lawyers to act
outside of the bounds of the Constitution. If the juror challenges were
251. Id.
252. Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System, 105 Yale LJ. 677, 712 (1995).
253. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 102 (Marshall,J, concurring) (articulating this concern).
254. Id. at 108.
255. Id. at 112.
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restricted solely to for cause challenges, both prosecutors and defense at-
torneys would be required to more vigorously interrogate jurors, as well
as to more clearly state their reasons for removal, to ensure that jurors are
removed for legitimate reasons and not because of race.
CONCLUSION
This research lays out an argument for altering the current view of
peremptory challenges and their utility in the adjudication of capital trials.
The maintenance of such instruments, despite quantitative and qualitative
evidence of their use in violation of the Constitution, forces the question,
"To what end do we allow their continuation?" These cases and the lack
of clarity on how to remedy racial discrimination in the use of peremp-
tory challenges have led us to repeat performances of a hearing which is
inadequate in its attempts to do just that. Batson hearings at their incep-
tion appeared to be an innovative approach in providing real-time
solutions to racial discrimination. Like some innovations, time and ex-
perience signal their failure and need to be scrapped for newer, bolder,
and stronger measures. This analysis urges that the appropriate measure is
the removal of these challenges from a process already fraught with con-
cerns of discrimination and bias.
Implicit in this work is a next question suggested by failure to cor-
rect juror error in these and other cases. Have the court concerns over fair
process for the defendants moved too far away from the early reasoning in
Strauder that viewed discrimination in the jury process as a denial of one
of the fundamental aspects of citizenship for African Americans? The fo-
cus on fairness to defendants may be obscuring other problems critical to
the question of racially discriminatory challenges of Black jurors. Later
work will pursue this question, but as the research discussed in this Article
suggests, the answer as to whether this tool-peremptory challenges-
infringes on the rights of African American citizens may be a foregone
conclusion.
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